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ABSTRACT
Plaintiffs have historically used defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress to vindicate their dignitary interests. But fifty years ago in New York Times v. Sullivan,
the Supreme Court reimagined these private law torts as public law causes of action that explicitly
privileged speech over dignity. This Article claims that Sullivan was a misguided attempt at
alchemy, manipulating state action doctrine to create more of a precious commodity—speech—
while preserving a tort channel for the most deserving plaintiffs. In Sullivan the Court departed
from its usual practice of narrowly defining the relevant state action in constitutional challenges
to private law matters. Instead, it defined state action to include not just the isolated verdict being
appealed but the entirety of the private law that produced the questionable verdict. This approach
aggrandized the Court’s authority to “fix” private law in the dignitary tort arena, where it seemed
to fear that insular communities could chill important news coverage by imposing parochial norms
onto the national community. The Court used its enhanced remedial authority to design a
national constitutional common law of dignitary tort. In the quasi-statutory scheme that emerged,
the Court attempted to strike an ex ante balance between valuable speech and wrongful behavior by
conditioning liability on different scienter requirements for different categories of plaintiff. But the
Sullivan project is rapidly failing. Operationally, insignificant but injurious speech such as
revenge porn has flourished under the Court’s brittle categorization matrix. Conceptually, the
private law message that speakers owe some duty to those they discuss has been supplanted with a
public law message that they have no duty of care. And instrumentally, enhanced speech
protections have resulted in more soft news about celebrities and less hard news about government.
Nevertheless, the Court’s original goal—barring the imposition of insular community norms onto
the nation as a whole while preserving a legally protected interest in individual dignity—is
important and achievable. The rulemaking of the Sullivan cases should be retired in favor of a
general constitutional principle barring judicial enforcement of verdicts that impose local
community norms onto the national community. This is precisely the kind of strong but flexible
constitutional guidance the Court would have rendered in Sullivan if it had followed its usual
state action approach.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1119
I. STATE ACTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE............................................................ 1124
∗

Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to participants in the Northwestern
University Junior Faculty Workshop, the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Constitutional Law Colloquium, the Chicago Area Junior Faculty Workshop, David A. Anderson,
David S. Han, Steven J. Heyman, Jim T. Lindgren, Martin H. Redish, and Howard M.
Wasserman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this piece.

1117

1118

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:4

A. The High Stakes of the State Action Requirement ............. 1125
B. State Action in Private Law Cases ................................. 1127
1. Contract .............................................................1128
2. Property ..............................................................1131
3. Trusts and Estates................................................1132
4. Torts ..................................................................1133
C. The Prudential Benefits of the Court’s Definitional Pattern 1134
II. STATE ACTION IN SULLIVAN ................................................... 1137
A. The Alabama Libel Tort and the Proceeding Below ............ 1138
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis ........................................ 1139
III. SULLIVAN AND THE CLASH OF COMMUNITIES ........................ 1144
A. Debunking the Intuitive Explanations for the Anomaly ....... 1144
B. The Community-Centered Explanation for Sullivan ........... 1146
1. The Two-Tiered Notion of Community in the United
States .................................................................1148
IV. THE COURT’S DIGNITARY TORT LAWMAKING ...................... 1152
A. The Court’s Categorical Scheme .................................... 1153
B. The Pitfalls of Constitutional Legislating ......................... 1155
1. Inconsistency. ......................................................1155
2. Imprecision ...........................................................1157
V. THE SUPPRESSION OF SUBSIDIARY COMMUNITIES.................. 1160
VI. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SULLIVAN ................. 1164
A. The Court’s Constitutional Legislation has Grown Obsolete1165
B. The Court’s Suppression of Subsidiary Community Values
has Changed the Notion of “Duty” in Dignitary Tort ........ 1168
C. The Failure of Sullivan to Incentivize a Vigorous Press........ 1171
VII. MODERNIZING DIGNITARY TORT......................................... 1173
A. The Multiplicity of American Communities ..................... 1174
B. Applying an Anti-Externalization Rule to Twenty-First
Century Communities .................................................. 1175
1. Anti-Externalization in the Intracommunity Context ..1177
2. Anti-Externalization in the Intercommunity Context ..1178
CONCLUSION............................................................................... 1179

Apr. 2015]

ALCHEMY OF STATE ACTION

1119

INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
began to redistrict defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress from the realm of private law constructed by local
juries and courts to the realm of public law promulgated by the Court
itself. The Court essentially rewrote these torts to nullify their impact
on democratically significant speech.
Sullivan was a remarkable act of alchemy, transforming what for
centuries had been dignity-protective torts that signaled a duty of
care towards plaintiffs into speech-protective torts that signaled the
opposite. The Court managed this feat by taking an unprecedented
approach to finding the state action necessary to justify constitutional
scrutiny of these torts. The Court defined the relevant state action in
Sullivan at a level of generality never before found in a case challenging the constitutionality of a state private law verdict. This generous
definition of the relevant state action meant that the Court had more
authority to remedy the eventual deficiencies it found in the state law
with a tort scheme of its own making. Crucially, the Court’s remaking of the common law turned on whether the plaintiff was categorized as “public” or “private.” In the pre-Internet age, these categories were rough proxies for the civic importance of the speech
involved. But in an age of social media speech designed to encourage the performance of private life on a public platform, the great
majority of individuals have become “public” to some extent, putting
tort remedies for speech injuries out of reach for many.
Popular sentiment in favor of the Sullivan outcome has obscured
serious attention to the state action analysis in the case. But that
analysis explains both the promise and the problems associated with
the constitutionalization of dignitary tort law. By deploying a radically general definition of the state action under review in the case, the
Court was able to block local communities from externalizing their
values onto the national community, a dynamic that had the potential
to silence important speech. However, the Court’s quasi-statutory
“correction” of this area of the law has disabled dignitary tort as a response to online injuries such as cyberbullying, revenge porn, and
mugshot extortion. Legislators are now struggling to criminalize the1
se behaviors ex ante via statute, despite First Amendment objections.
1

See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 372–74 & nn.175–76 (2014) (discussing different states’ attempts
pass bills criminalizing the publishing of revenge porn and outlining parameters of the
crime).
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Freed from the Court’s categorical scheme, tort has the potential to
send ex post deterrent signals against injurious behavior. Such a private law approach would be less speech-inhibiting than criminalizing
entire categories of communication and invoking the state’s prosecutorial apparatus against those who violate these statutory prior re2
straints.
Part I of this Article examines the Court’s typical treatment of
constitutional challenges to judicial actions involving private law
rules. It demonstrates that in cases involving contract law, property
law, trust law, and economic torts, the Court has consistently identified the relevant state action as the discrete enforcement action under review—that is, the specific verdict or injunction being chal3
Because it labors to narrow the state action under
lenged.
consideration to the exercise of power that has infringed a specific
litigant’s constitutional right, it typically restricts itself to reversing
4
just the state court injunction or verdict against that litigant. In this
respect, the Court’s practice is akin to a prudential jurisdictional rule,
and it provides similar separation-of-powers and federalism benefits.
First, it prevents the Court from overreaching horizontally into the
lawmaking function. When state action is defined narrowly, the most
the Court can do is invalidate the discrete verdict or injunction at issue, rather than jettison a fully developed body of private law in favor
of its own scheme. Second, it prevents the Court from overreaching
vertically into the structural prerogative of the states and their subsidiary communities. When state action is defined narrowly, the Court’s
role is to approve or disprove the rules that states have developed in
accord with their local preferences, rather than to infuse state rules
with preferences that reflect the national ethos.
Part II of this Article contrasts the Court’s prudential state action
approach with its analysis in Sullivan, where a Montgomery, Alabama,
official sued over his depiction in the pages of the New York Times.
There, the Court identified as state action not just the specific verdict
against the Times but the entirety of Alabama libel law as it was ap5
plied to litigants generally. This Part demonstrates that if the Court
had followed its usual approach and defined the relevant state action
to include just the verdict against the Times, it could have protected
the newspaper from liability by simply reversing the verdict as an un2
3
4
5

See generally Anne Bloom, The Radiating Effects of Torts, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 229 (2013)
(identifying how tort suits can influence public behavior).
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.
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constitutional application of existing state tort rules. 6 Instead, the
Court defined the relevant state action to include all of Alabama libel
law, found that body of law constitutionally deficient, and supplied a
7
replacement set of federal tort rules. This radical approach did not
just correct the verdict in this case but redistricted the tort of libel
from a purely private law matter under sole control of the states to a
hybrid public-private law matter shared by the state and federal government. Further, in broadly defining and then drastically reimagining Alabama libel law, the Court essentially took for itself a power
that the Constitution specifically denied to Congress and the states:
8
generating centralized government norms for speech.
Part III considers why the Court was so enthusiastic about broadening the scope of state action in Sullivan and reengineering dignitary torts in the cases that followed. It rejects the possibility that the
Court is motivated by a special solicitude for speech, since it defines
state action modestly in contract, property, and financial tort cases
9
where private law is alleged to abridge speech. It ultimately concludes that the Court’s manipulation of the state action definition in
these cases is an attempt to grapple with the multiplicity of communities within the United States in the context of torts that explicitly in10
voke “community” norms to determine wrongfulness. At the founding, the United States was a collection of local communities, each of
which was fairly homogenous, stable, and culturally compact. Dignitary torts inflicted via communication were generally restricted to the
confines of these communities, meaning that the community norms
governing the finding of a legal wrong were easily ascertained and
shared. By the mid-twentieth century, the United States had added to
these subsidiary communities a national tier of community, which was
transient and heterogeneous. Further, faster communications and
printing technologies had transformed the news business from an exclusively local concern to a national endeavor. Consequently, defamation cases were no longer exclusively local disputes, but had the
potential to pit the values of local communities against each other, or
11
against the values of a national community. The Court’s desire to

6
7
8
9
10
11

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.1.
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mediate this contest is the most persuasive explanation for its activist
12
state action approach in Sullivan.
Part IV analyzes the Court’s use of Sullivan as a springboard for
horizontal overreaching into the lawmaking function. The decision
began the process of transforming defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) from private law stressing compensation for injury to public law stressing speakers’ rights.
This Part begins by describing the constitutional common law rules
promulgated by the Court. These rules attempt to balance dignity
and speech by creating a matrix of plaintiff categories and culpability
categories and assigning different constitutional protections to each
13
category. The goal of the scheme was to protect democratically relevant speech while preserving a right to dignitary compensation for
14
insignificant or exceptionally injurious speech. But the inconsistency and imprecision of these categories has sent confusing signals
about the Court’s commitment to retaining a viable tort device for
dignitary interests. Part IV concludes by suggesting that these defects
in the Court’s scheme are a direct result of the non-prudential state
action analysis in Sullivan, which allowed the Court to step outside its
institutional competence—deciding cases—and instead attempt to
legislate, an endeavor for which it was ill-suited.
Part V examines how the Court’s lawmaking scheme effectively
accomplished a vertical overreach into the state prerogative to make
private law that reflects its political sovereignty and respects the values of its subsidiary communities. This Part shows how the Court
suppressed the values of state and subsidiary communities as it remade dignitary tort law. First, the Court wiped out individual state
rules designed to distinguish message-oriented speech from injuryoriented speech, imposing instead a uniform federal scheme for do15
ing so. Second, the Court declined to defer to state rules that could
have informed the content of its categorical scheme. Finally, the
Court repeatedly overturned jury instructions and jury verdicts that
delegated to members of local communities the responsibility to de16
cide when speech was sufficiently injurious to warrant a tort verdict.
Throughout its dignitary tort cases, the Court consistently denigrated
both states as a unit of civic organization and local communities as a

12
13
14
15
16

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
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unit of social organization, designing rules that disempowered those
entities by imposing central government speech rules.
Part VI documents how Sullivan has failed to deliver on its early
promise to protect nationally significant speech while preserving a
tort channel to vindicate insignificant or exceptionally injurious
speech. While the Court’s public-private categories have shielded unpopular national speech from expensive jury verdicts, they are grow17
ing irrelevant in the age of electronic speech and social media.
Speech conducted over Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram is not easily
described as either public or private. In these exchanges, uncelebrated individuals may be communicating with each other while
hundreds or thousands “follow,” “like,” or “retweet” their speech.
This dynamic turns on their heads concepts such as “public figure,”
“private figure,” and “issues of public concern.” As more online
speech seems to drift definitionally into these constitutionally protected “public” categories, tort causes of action have grown functionally unavailable to plaintiffs. This state of affairs means that tort’s
signaling power is sending the message that individuals do not have a
legally protected interest in their dignity and that speakers do not
18
have a duty of care to avoid doing dignitary harm. This message
appears inconsistent with the Court’s design in Sullivan, which explicitly recognized the continuing relevance of the defamation tort despite carving out a protection for publicly relevant speech. Finally,
these costs to individual dignity have not been offset by the benefit of
more democratically relevant speech, at least in the context of news
19
coverage.
Part VII suggests that the dignitary tort law that would have followed from a prudential state action analysis would better achieve the
central goal of Sullivan for today’s era. When the Court has followed
prudential state action analysis, it has restricted itself to announcing
constitutional principles and invalidating or remanding verdicts that
disobey those principles. This approach to dignitary tort is better
suited for the modern age. The constitutional principle of Sullivan is
that subsidiary communities may not externalize their behavioral
norms onto other subsidiary communities or the national communi20
ty. The Court’s obsolete categorical scheme should be retired in favor of a rule prohibiting court enforcement of verdicts that externalize subsidiary community norms. Thus, where both speech and
17
18
19
20

See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part VI.C.
See infra Part VII.A.
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injury take place within a relatively homogenous subcommunity, private law treatment is warranted and constitutional rejection of result21
ing verdicts will be unnecessary. In contrast, when speech is national in nature and injury is the product of a subcommunity’s values (or
when speech resides within an insular subcommunity but the national
community agrees that the speech is harmful), public law oversight of
22
the tort remedy is warranted. This approach would retain both the
private law and public law versions of dignitary tort but allow particular cases to be sifted into the different tiers of law more flexibly to
permit nimble ex post responses to emerging technologies. Reanimating the private law of tort as an inexpensive signaling device may
ultimately be more speech-protective than current efforts to criminalize revenge porn, mugshot extortion, and cyberbullying behavior.
I. STATE ACTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE
The Court cannot review the constitutionality of purely private action; its authority to review cases “arising under” the Constitution 23
depends on a finding that the behavior at issue in the case can be at24
tributed to the state. This state action requirement is crucial to the
Court’s power, and yet it has remained a highly indeterminate concept for more than a century. The Court has failed to develop a doctrinally coherent principle for distinguishing between state behavior
and private behavior when the state and private individuals have
jointly deprived an opponent of constitutional rights. More specifically, when the lower court action under review is the adjudication of
a dispute between private parties based on private law principles, the
Court has never explicitly stated how much of state private law should
be swept within the “state action” definition. In practice, however,
the Court has followed what appears to be a prudential rule that the
relevant state action should be defined at the most granular level possible. As a result, the Court generally considers the actual verdict in
the case as the state action, and does not examine the abstract private
law rules that produced the verdict. This practice has been followed
in contract, property, trust and estate, and economic tort cases over
the years.
21
22
23
24

See infra Part VII.B.1.
See infra Part VII.B.2.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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This approach appears to share constitutional DNA with other
prudential requirements applied in the “case or controversy” context,
wherein the Court employs rules that prevent it from encroaching on
coordinate branches of government or on the state prerogative to de25
velop local law. Like those prudential rules, the prudential practice
of narrowly defining state action has generally prevented the Court
from formulating rules of law broader than those necessary to resolve
the case at hand.
A. The High Stakes of the State Action Requirement
The Fourteenth Amendment provided in 1868 that no “State
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
26
process of law . . . .” The command means that action by government at any level—federal, state, or local—is now subject to the in27
Thus, determining
corporated provisions of the Constitution.
whether the Constitution applies to behavior alleged to deprive an
individual of a guaranteed right must begin with determining whether the complained-of behavior is state action. State action theory has
28
been notoriously called a “conceptual disaster area.” Several distinct
phenomena have contributed to this so-called disaster. Many disa29
gree about the purpose of the state action requirement. Further,
25

26
27
28
29

See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique
of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1289, 1294–95 (2005) (explaining that the Court’s self-imposed limits on its federal question jurisdiction, including justiciability doctrines and abstention, were designed to prevent the Court from violating separation of powers principles and from encroaching upon state authority).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507 n.15 (1985) (citation omitted).
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
The purpose of the requirement is not altogether clear. Some opine that immunizing
non-state action from constitutional scrutiny maximizes individual autonomy; the typical
examples of behavior that falls outside the realm of state action include selecting a spouse
or hosting a dinner party. See, e.g., Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2010) (noting that individuals’ decisions
about whom to marry are not state action); see also Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Developments in the
Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1257 (2010)
(noting that Justice Joseph P. Bradley, introducing the state action doctrine in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883), suggested that treating relations between private individuals as immune from constitutional scrutiny “promote[d] the individualist goal of selfrealization”). In contrast, others say that limiting federal constitutional review to state action rather than individual action is a way of allocating power between the state and federal governments. Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The “Government Function”
and “Power Theory” Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 757–58 (1979). That is, a chal-
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evolving theories about state action reflect the movement in American legal thought from a formal to an instrumental view of the law’s
30
purpose and the judge’s power.
Attempts to theorize the appropriate line between state action and
31
private action abound, but the Court has not settled on a single co-

30

31

lenge to the constitutionality of an individual act is really a challenge to how the state has
played its role as an intermediary between individual desires and federal constitutional
commands. If the state encouraged the act or failed to exercise its intermediary preventative power when it should have, state action exists and the federal government can intervene—either via judicial review or congressional legislation—to offset the state infringement of constitutional rights. Id. at 757–58. Identifying the existence of state
action is complicated by the duality of purpose behind the requirement. If the requirement is designed to maximize individual autonomy, the benign neglect of a state may further that autonomy and the state action classification may be counterproductive. Conversely, if the requirement is designed to deputize the individual states as enforcers of
constitutional values, state passivity that permits private unconstitutional behavior to
flourish is problematic and warrants a state action classification.
State action theory has been said to have proceeded in three phases roughly concurrent
with trends in American legal thought. The bedrock “state action” opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883 is typical of classical legal thought with its “way of thinking about law
as a system of spheres of autonomy for private and public actors . . . .” Developments in the
Law, supra note 29, at 1256 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 19, 20 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)). Justice Bradley concluded that the guarantee to individuals of due process was not violated by private acts
that lacked the imprimatur of the state. Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1256–58.
Thus, although the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to pass laws enforcing
the due process guarantee, Congress did not have authority under the amendment to
pass federal laws that aimed to regulate private acts. The second phase of state action
thinking, taking place in the mid-twentieth century, was consistent with social instrumentalist thinking. State action analysis during that period tended to accept the need for a
division between the public and private but moved away from formalism to allow application of the Constitution to address the social problem of racial discrimination, which
seemed intractable to all but a federal public law response. Id. at 1258. It was during the
heyday of these cases that Justice Jackson remarked in Brown v. Allen: “this Court has
found [state action] a ready instrument, in one field or another, to magnify federal, and
incidentally its own, authority over the states.” 344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Contemporary state action theory is split to reflect what Kennedy calls “‘the
unsynthesized coexistence of transformed elements of [classical legal thought] with transformed elements of the social.’” Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1261 (alteration in
original) (quoting Kennedy, supra note 30, at 63). Today, some advocate the elimination
of the doctrine altogether to allow a full account of rights and interests, while others want
to retain it in the name of protecting individual autonomy. Developments in the Law, supra
note 29, at 1261.
See BeVier & Harrison, supra note 29, at 1773 (theorizing that state action exists when a
public rather than private choice invokes the application of government power); Robert
J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 226–27 (1976) (observing that the “unitary”
conceptualization of state action has given way to a functional view, under which “the
Court decides state action cases by balancing the values which are advanced or limited by
each of the conflicting private rights”); Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1261 n.45
(citing cases defending the state action doctrine).
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herent principle to guide its analysis. The ad hoc approach to state
action may be less significant in cases where the conduct under review is concrete and finite—if a privately run primary election is state
32
action, the election mechanism is subject to the Constitution, and
private actors running the election can either run the election accordingly or stop running elections altogether. The Court’s application of the Constitution to the action simply compels constitutional
adherence or abstention, but neither response creates a legal vacuum
for the Court to fill.
The ambiguity in state action theory has potentially greater consequences in fact patterns where state authority fortifies allegedly unconstitutional private action, for instance where a court adjudicates a
contract, property, or tort dispute.
Scholars such as Erwin
Chemerinsky and Cass Sunstein contend that “state action is always
33
present” because all private relations are negotiated based on allocations of rights, powers, and interests conferred by law. That is, all private exercises of power are premised on the state’s allocation of
background rights and duties and are effective only because of the
possibility of enforcement via a private law suit adjudicated in the
34
public courts. If all private behavior subject to challenge in court
under private law rules is considered state action, dramatic consequences follow. Either the courts have unconstrained power to extend constitutional norms to private behavior, or Congress has the
power under the Fourteenth Amendment itself to pass legislation replacing state action (or inaction) that has created an unconstitutional
background private law rule with a federally preferred rule.
B. State Action in Private Law Cases
Because of the dramatic consequences of the state action determination in private law cases, the Supreme Court’s first move—
defining the relevant state action—may be its most significant one. If
the Court defines the relevant state action as the specific verdict or
injunction rendered in the case under review, a finding of unconstitutionality leaves nothing to do but reverse or remand the particular
case before it. But if the Court defines the relevant state action to in-

32
33

34

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1944).
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 506 (suggesting the elimination of the state action
requirement as a precursor to constitutional scrutiny); Cass R. Sunstein, State Action is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 465, 467 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, State Action] (noting
that much discussion ignores the extent of state presence).
See, e.g., Sunstein, State Action, supra note 33, at 466.
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clude the underlying principles of private law that produced the verdict, a finding of unconstitutionality is far more significant. Delegitimizing foundational rules of contract, property, estates, or tort that
common law courts have developed over decades leaves a vacuum
35
The
and throws the ordering of private relations into disarray.
Court has never articulated a prudential rule to govern this definitional exercise in private law cases, but its opinions reveal a consistent
and modest practice: the Court generally defines the relevant state
action at a very granular level, so that even if it finds the action unconstitutional, it has no more to do than affirm or reverse the specific
verdict or injunction below.
1. Contract
The Court first considered whether litigation governed by private
36
law principles was state action in Shelley v. Kraemer. Shelley involved
the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants pursuant to state
contract law, one in Missouri and one in Michigan, among large
groups of homeowners providing that no parcels were to be owned by
37
non-Caucasians. In the Missouri case, upon the sale of one parcel to
an African-American family, the owners of neighboring properties
sued for an injunction restraining the family from taking possession
and revesting the title in the seller or some other person identified by
38
the court. The Missouri trial court denied the requested relief because the agreement did not comply with the requirements for making a contract under state law, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and ordered the trial court to grant the injunctive relief

35

36
37
38

Not all background rules of private law are the product of common-law lawmaking, and
not all common-law lawmaking produces private law. For instance, some private law
principles in the cases discussed below were provided for via statute. See, e.g., Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439–40 (1970) (noting that Georgia law provided that Georgia cities
and towns could accept property for the establishment of parks and hold the property in
trust for the benefit of persons named by the testator); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 261 (1964) (noting that Alabama law denied a public officer recovery in a
libel action). Further, some rules derived from state judge common law adjudication are
decidedly public in nature, such as rules empowering the state to oversee picketing and
to issue judicial contempt citations. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1948)
(citing as examples of judicial state action enforcement of state policies developed by
common-law adjudication against peaceful picketing, the common law crime of breach of
the peace, and the common law rule allowing contempt citations for disrespect of judicial
authority by publication).
334 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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requested. 39 In the Michigan case, the African-American purchasers
40
moved into the home and other owners brought suit. The judge entered a decree directing the purchasers to vacate the house within
41
ninety days; the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court emphasized that it was not reviewing the underlying abstract rules of contract that permitted the restrictive covenants:
[R]estrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to [the] petitioners by the Fourteenth
Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there
has been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment
42
have not been violated.

Instead, it described the relevant state action question in the cases:
“whether enforcement by state courts of the restrictive agreements in
43
these cases may be deemed to be the acts of those States . . . .” When
the state “made available to [the covenantors] the full coercive power
of government to deny to [the buyers] . . . the enjoyment of property
44
rights in [the] premises[,]” it engaged in state action. Even though
the enforcement actions were “directed pursuant to the common-law
policy of the States as formulated by those courts in earlier deci45
sions[,]” the state action requiring constitutional review and reversal
46
was the enforcement alone, not the common-law policy of the states.
The underlying contract principles of the states were neither reviewed nor revised. For instance, had the Court defined the state action more broadly to include the underlying rules of contract, it
could have announced a constitutional rule that racially restrictive
covenants were per se unconscionable.
Five years later, in Barrows v. Jackson, the Court found that a state
court award of damages for breaching a restrictive covenant agreement would also have been state action (although every court to consider the plaintiff’s request for contract damages had declined to
award them):
To compel respondent to respond in damages would be for the State to
punish her for her failure to perform her covenant to continue to dis-

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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criminate against non-Caucasians in the use of her property. The result
of that sanction by the State would be to encourage the use of restrictive
covenants. To that extent, the State would act to put its sanction behind
the covenants. If the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to
carry out her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her property in
a discriminatory manner, which in essence is the purpose of the covenant. Thus, it becomes not respondent’s voluntary choice but the State’s
choice that she observe her covenant or suffer damages. The action of a
state court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant here
involved would constitute state action as surely as it was state action to en47
force such covenants in equity, as in Shelley . . . .

The Court therefore affirmed the California lower court decision
granting the demurrer to the complaint seeking damages and the
48
state reviewing court’s affirmance of that decision. As in Shelley, although the Court was willing to apply public law principles to a private
law matter, it restricted the scope of review to the specific enforcement action without examining the particulars of California’s con49
tract law for constitutional defects.
In a more recent case analyzing the state action status of a state
private law of promissory estoppel, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the
Court defined the state action more broadly but again deferred to the
50
In Cohen, the Court restate’s authority to develop private law.
viewed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that where a
newspaper that had promised anonymity to a source and later identified him in its pages, the source could not succeed in an action for
51
damages relying on the principle of promissory estoppel. The state
court reasoned that applying its law of promissory estoppel, which
was designed to prevent “injustice,” necessarily required weight to be
given to the media’s First Amendment rights to determine the “jus52
tice” served by a damage award. The Court stated that the first issue
in the case was whether a private cause of action for promissory es53
toppel was state action that triggered the First Amendment. The
Court defined the relevant state action more broadly here, to include
the background rules that gave rise to the obligation between the
parties. But it coupled this more expansive state action definition
47
48
49

50
51
52
53

346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
Id. at 249, 260.
Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson, in dissent, suggested that even categorizing the enforcement of a damages award as state action was pressing the Constitution too far, barring California from developing and applying its own private law of contract. Id. at 263–
64 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
Id. at 665–67.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 668.
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with a highly deferential review of the abstract promissory estoppel
rules. The Court reasoned that because the Minnesota private law
rules of promissory estoppel were neutral rules “applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota,” and did not “single
out” the press, they were not an infringement on the newspaper’s
54
First Amendment rights.
2. Property
The Court has demonstrated the same pattern of defining state
action at a granular level in property cases. Peterson v. City of Green55
ville involved a set of consolidated cases where participants in civil
rights sit-ins were convicted of trespass in South Carolina, Louisiana,
Alabama, and North Carolina. The Court found state action underlying the trespass convictions because the private store and restaurant
owners who had asked the patrons to leave and eventually sought police enforcement of those requests were motivated by local laws, ordinances, and official statements either requiring or endorsing segregated facilities. Thus, in these cases, judicial enforcement of a state
private law property right to exclude visitors from the establishment
was more than a neutral application of property law principles, but
was imbued with a state preference for segregation. The convictions,
56
therefore, were reversed. The Court did not examine the underlying principles of state trespass law in any of the cases, instead restricting itself to reversing the specific enforcement actions.
57
In Bell v. Maryland, the Court addressed the convictions of student sit-in participants for criminal trespass charges brought by a local restaurateur who called the police after the students refused to
leave his establishment. In a 3-3-3 split opinion, the Court remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of changes in both Baltimore
58
However, one-third of the Court
and Maryland segregation law.
54
55

56

57
58

Id. at 670.
373 U.S. 244 (1963); see generally Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262
(1963) (Alabama criminal trespass case); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963)
(Louisiana demonstration case); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963) (per
curiam) (Alabama demonstration case); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963)
(per curiam) (North Carolina demonstration case).
Notably, Justice John Marshall Harlan II examined the circumstances behind each individual protest and suggested that unless the protesters could prove that the private landowners brought the trespass actions solely because they felt compelled by state segregation law to do so, the trespass actions were private—not state—action. Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248–61 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
378 U.S. 226, 227–28 (1964).
Id. at 241–42.
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concurred only because it would have reversed the convictions after
concluding that the criminal enforcement of the trespass law against
the protesters was unconstitutional state action. That wing of the
Court reasoned that the relevant question was “the degree to which a
59
State has participated in depriving a person of a right.” Here, the
criminal trespass statute was used by a private person to deny another
private person access to property solely on the basis of race. But because “Maryland enforced that [race-based private] policy with her
police, her prosecutors, and her courts[,]” it had deployed state ac60
tion that triggered constitutional review. In contrast, a dissenting
wing of the Court concluded that Maryland’s application of its trespass laws to the protesters was not state action. The dissenting Justices reasoned that the state trespass law was not promulgated to achieve
a racially restrictive end, but merely established “every propertyowner’s . . . normal right to choose his business visitors or social
61
guests . . . .” That the property owner’s choices were animated by
segregationist goals did not mean that judicial enforcement of the
longstanding Maryland property principles were an instance of state
62
segregationist action. Notably, no member of the Court suggested
that Maryland’s underlying private law allocating to property owners
the right to decide who could enter their land was state action under
constitutional review, or suggested any doctrinal changes to that underlying law. Even those who wished to define the convictions under
the law as state action restricted the relevant judicial state action to
the adjudication of the specific cases before the court and entry of
the convictions—in short, to “enforcement” of the private law of tres63
pass, not to the underlying development of those trespass principles.
3. Trusts and Estates
The Court has followed the same approach in the context of state
trust law. Evans v. Abney involved the construction by a Georgia trial
court of a trust that conveyed property to the city of Macon for use as

59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 257.
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 332 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id.
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 228 (1964) (referring to “convictions” as the action); id. at
245 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the action under consideration as the commercial consequence of the state’s discrimination); id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the question as whether Maryland could “enforce its trespass laws to convict” the protesters).
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a whites-only park. 64 In an earlier case, Evans v. Newton, the Court
had held that city administration of a segregated park was unconstitu65
tional state action. In response, the trustees of the grantor’s estate
moved for a ruling that the specific intent of the grantor to create a
park for the “sole, perpetual and unending, use, benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls, white boys and white children
of the City of Macon,” and “under no circumstances . . . to be . . . at
any time for any reason devoted to any other purpose[,]” meant that
requiring the city to integrate the park would defeat the purpose of
66
the trust. The Georgia court was urged to apply the state’s statutory
cy pres doctrine to read the racially restrictive terms out of the grantor’s will so that the general purpose of creating a park could be real67
ized. The state court refused to apply cy pres, explaining that if a
grantor’s primary intent was not general charity, but a specific and
impossible scheme, cy pres was not justified and the grantor is pre68
sumed to have preferred that the trust fail. In this case, the state
court concluded, that meant that the parkland should revert to the
69
On review, the Supreme Court found that the
grantor’s heirs.
court’s application of Georgia trust principles in the construction of
the will was state action but was constitutionally permissible. It reasoned that “[t]he construction of wills is essentially a state law question,” and this will was construed to prioritize the segregation of the
70
parkland over the public donation of the parkland. The Court was
persuaded that the state action was constitutional in large part because both the underlying trust rules and the state courts’ application
of them appeared to be neutral and unmotivated by unconstitutional,
race-conscious intent.
4. Torts
Finally, the Court has defined state action at a granular level in
the private law of torts where the cause of action reflected a plaintiff’s
interest in business relations. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the

64
65

66
67
68
69
70

396 U.S. 435, 436 (1970).
382 U.S. 296, 311–12 (1966) (White, J., concurring) (finding that the tract of land willed
in trust by Senator Augustus O. Bacon to the city exclusively for use by white people could
not continue to be operated on a discriminatory basis).
Abney, 396 U.S. at 439, 441–42 (first and second omission in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Id. at 439–40.
Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 444.
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Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a malicious interference with
business relations verdict entered by an equity court imposing damages on civil rights protesters who organized a boycott against local
71
businesses. The Court noted that the state action under review in
the case was the “application” of Mississippi tort law to adjudicate the
72
private law dispute between the parties. It then conducted an asapplied review of the analysis in the case, determining that the lower
court had distorted the facts presented at trial to characterize the en73
tirety of the months-long boycott as violent and therefore tortious.
Instead, performing its own review of the record, the Court concluded that the boycott featured some violent activity interspersed with a
74
great deal of peaceful expressive activity. The Court then reversed
the tort judgment and damages verdict against all of the protesters
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s explanation
that the weighty constitutional interest in speech required the court
below to identify specific acts of concrete violence before imposing
75
tort liability on any of the protesters. The Court did not review, let
alone replace, the abstract principles of Mississippi tortious interfer76
ence law.
C. The Prudential Benefits of the Court’s Definitional Pattern
The state action doctrine is usually conceptualized as a matter of
constitutional, and ultimately, political, theory. When the Court’s job
is to determine whether private behavior should be imputed to the
government, that conceptualization is sound. But in the narrow category of cases involving the adjudication of private law claims, the
weight of the question shifts from one grounded in political theory
about the relationship between individual and state to one grounded
in jurisdictional theory about the relationship of the Court to other
institutional actors. After all, there is little doubt in these cases that
state action exists—the state court has rendered a verdict or injunction, which in turn dictates how far the Court’s remedial power will
extend. Without explicitly describing the question as such, the Court
seems to have deployed prudential considerations to answer it. This
approach is, perhaps, unsurprising. The Court has historically em-

71
72
73
74
75
76

458 U.S. 886, 891, 894 (1982).
Id. at 916 n.51 (emphasis added).
Id. at 922–23.
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id.
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ployed prudential doctrines to voluntarily limit the reach of its own
power when it appears that the exercise of that power may impose on
77
a competing institutional actor. The Court is generally thought to
have adopted existing prudential rules policing its own jurisdiction,
such as justiciability doctrines, abstention doctrines, sovereign immunity, and the like, to prevent both horizontal overreaching into
the lawmaking function and vertical overreaching into the prerogative of state governments to develop and apply their own law. For instance, prudential standing rules reinforce the separation of powers
principle by limiting the Court to resolution of specific disputes rather than far-reaching abstract policy questions that have been allo78
cated to the political branches. These rules prevent horizontal encroachment upon the other branches of the federal government.
Similarly, prudential rules have been said to “have a strong federalism
component,” preventing the Court from vertically invading the prov79
ince of the states.
Prudential concerns make sense of the Court’s usual approach to
defining state action when reviewing state court adjudication of a private law claim: although the Court almost certainly can define state
action as broadly as it wishes, it generally has defined state action very
narrowly. Throughout contract, property, trusts and estates, and tort,
the Court has demonstrated a consistent approach to defining the
“state action” involved in alleged constitutional harms arising from
enforcement of private law principles. It defines the relevant state action at a granular level, to include just the rendering of a verdict or
injunction in a specific case. If it finds the action unconstitutional, it
77

78

79

While many theorists praise the Court’s self-restraint via prudential doctrines, see, e.g.,
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 79 (1961), some feel the Court is constitutionally obliged to exercise its Article
III jurisdiction, see, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Passive Virtues, the Counter-Majoritarian Principle, and the “Judicial-Political” Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 22 CONN. L. REV. 647,
647–48 (1990) (arguing that “the passive virtues are, to varying degrees, premised on a
misconception of the judiciary’s vital political role within our constitutional system”).
This article does not take a position on whether the Court’s voluntary passivity is good or
bad as a matter of political theory. Instead, it observes that in the state action context (as
in other contexts), the Court appears to have manipulated its prudential approach to
achieve a policy goal and appears to attempt to demonstrate that it might have better
achieved that goal by hewing to the same prudential approach it has followed throughout
the rest of its cases defining the state action represented by private law adjudication.
See, e.g., William Marks, Note, Bond, Buckley, and the Boundaries of Separation of Powers
Standing, 67 VAND. L. REV. 505, 508–10 (2014) (discussing the “three basic prudential
rules” required for standing: that a litigant may only assert her own interests, that the
courts “will decline to entertain cases based only on ‘generalized grievances,’” and that a
suit must “fall within the ‘zone of interests’ protected by the relevant statute”).
Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 292 n.87 (1984).
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reverses the entry of the injunction or the verdict. Occasionally, the
Court defines the relevant state action at a slightly higher level of
generality, to include the lower court’s application of background private law rules to the record facts to produce the contested injunction
or verdict. Only twice has the Court defined the relevant state action
at a high enough level of generality to encompass abstract rule of private law, and in these cases the Court found those abstract rules con80
stitutional.
The Court’s pattern of defining state action as modestly as possible serves both the horizontal and vertical purposes that drive other
prudential doctrines. First, by confining its review to the precise verdict before it, the Court leaves in place the abstract rules of private
law that have been developed by institutions with designated authority to make law, either elected legislators or common law courts. The
modest definition of state action therefore prevents horizontal encroachment upon the function of lawmaking institutions. Second, by
limiting the boundaries of the state action under review, the Court
avoids imposing federal government values beyond the minimum degree necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements. The modest
definition of state action prevents vertical encroachment upon the
state prerogative to develop law in accordance with its own prefer81
ences, and those of its subsidiary communities.
Thus, for example, Shelley defined the relevant state action as the
entry of two specific injunctions premised on racially restrictive cove82
nants, found those actions unconstitutional, and reversed them.
The Court emphasized that state courts could not enforce such cove80

81

82

See case cited supra notes 50–54 (explaining that the Court defined state action to include
background rules of state contract law in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991)); see also cases cited supra notes 64–70 (explaining that the Court defined state action to include background rules of trust law in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 935 (1970)).
Although this Article is exclusively concerned with the Court’s use of state action to justify
constitutional constraints on defamation and other dignitary torts, the proper scope of
state action has implications for other public-private law conflicts. For example, the incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states, at issue in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 762–63, 774–75 (2010), raises the possibility that tort verdicts requiring gun owners to internalize damages associated with gun storage or gun use may be
construed as state action infringing the right to keep and bear arms. If so, the Court’s
definition of the state action represented by this area of the law would dictate the degree
of Court authority to wipe out state tort principles to make way for unfettered enjoyment
of gun ownership. So too with recent efforts to encourage chain restaurants to bar patrons from carrying guns—if the private law of property that gives restaurant owners the
right to eject gun carriers from the premises is construed as state action, the Court would
have the authority to wipe out property law principles that support such anti-gun
measures.
334 U.S. at 19–20, 23.
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nants but it did not attempt to recast state rules of contract to prevent
83
the use of the covenants. Instead, it left states and local communities to sort out the appropriate treatment of these instruments on
84
their own. Evidence suggests that the simple prohibition on enforcement of the covenants, even without a constitutional common
law of contract explicating a racial unconscionability doctrine, was
85
sufficient to thwart the practice. In the years following Shelley, re86
strictive provisions in deeds were delegitimized and Congress passed
87
legislation prospectively barring them. The prudential approach to
defining state action in Shelley produced a clear constitutional signal
but prevented the Court from trespassing on the lawmaking function
or imposing its own values onto states and subsidiary communities.
II. STATE ACTION IN SULLIVAN
The Court took a markedly different approach to defining state
action in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which challenged a state def88
amation verdict. The prevailing view before Sullivan was that common law rules permitting individual plaintiffs to recover damages
from defamatory speakers belonged entirely to private law, outside
89
Sullivan
the sphere of federal constitutional concern.
83
84

85

86
87
88
89

Id. at 22–23.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19 (isolating judicial enforcement of the covenants as the problematic
state action and intimating that if judicial enforcement were unavailable, minorities were
likely to achieve “full enjoyment” of property rights “available to other members of the
community”).
Motoko Rich, Restrictive Covenants Stubbornly Stay on the Books, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at
F1 (explaining that though it was procedurally complex to strike covenants that ran with
the land and also included uncontroversial provisions such as fence height restrictions,
real estate lawyers and title search companies began to strike out such covenants of their
own accord; further, several states, including Missouri, Virginia and California have initiated legislation to formally eliminate racially restrictive language from existing covenants).
See id.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012) (making it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling”).
376 U.S. at 256.
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 36–37 (1995).
Notably, given their autonomy at the time to develop their own tort rules, some states had
introduced speech-protective principles into the private law. See CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE,
DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS: THE EVOLVING LAW OF LIBEL 128 (1971) (discussing
the liberal rule of libel law). However, variation among the states was significant. See id.
at 209. As of 1963, ten states applied the tort without limitations from any principles designed to honor speakers’ rights. See id. at 209–10 (discussing the history of state treatment of freedom of discussion). Twenty-two states had judicially recognized a privilege
from defamation liability for speakers engaging in fair comment and criticism of public
officials based on actual facts. Id. at 128, 209. Nineteen states had judicially recognized a
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reconceptualized the private law defamation rules enforceable via the
coercive power of the state as a proper subject of public law scrutiny.
This Part outlines the background rules of libel in Alabama. It then
illustrates how the state jury and state courts applied them unconstitutionally in Sullivan. Finally, it examines how the Court departed
from its usual prudential state action definition and practice to define the state action in Sullivan at a remarkably high level of generality, to include all of Alabama libel law. Following this move, the Court
reached into those background rules and rewrote them to privilege
speech and subordinate reputation in cases brought by public officials. In short, the Court’s non-prudential state action definition
produced the horizontal latitude to make law and the vertical latitude
to impose its values onto local communities.
A. The Alabama Libel Tort and the Proceeding Below
In 1960, The New York Times published an issue advertisement
submitted by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
90
Struggle for Freedom in the South. The text of the ad recounted
several key events in the civil rights movement, with two paragraphs
focusing on incidents in Montgomery, Alabama. L.B. Sullivan, the
member of Montgomery’s elected three-commissioner government
responsible for public safety (including oversight of the police de91
partment) sued the Times for libel, contending that his reputation
was harmed by false statements in the ad regarding the conduct of
92
Among the complained-of falsehoods were
Montgomery police.
that the police had “ringed” a local college campus to quell protesters, when in fact they had come onto the campus but had not formed

90

91

92

privilege from defamation liability for speakers who made misstatements of fact about
public officials without malice. Id. Further, in states that conditioned privilege on an absence of malice, “malice” was defined in a variety of different ways—while Pennsylvania
required a “studied and deliberate charge,” South Dakota looked only for “intent to injure,” and many states, including Minnesota, did not define malice at all, saying only that
a plaintiff could prove malice by showing the speaker knew the words were “false, if there
was ill will or feeling, or if there was exaggeration in presentation . . . .” Id. at 168–169.
In short, there was no uniform agreement among the states that the tort had to account
for speech imperatives, and even states that did try to balance reputation and speech
struck that balance in very different ways.
Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South,
Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, available in ANTHONY LEWIS,
MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2–3 (1991).
KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 11–12 (2011) (discussing Sullivan’s personal background and
role as director of public safety).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–58 (1964).
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a ring around it, that they had “padlocked” the campus dining hall to
“starve the students into submission,” which had apparently not happened, that “police” had harassed King with frivolous arrests and that
93
“Southern violators” had bombed his home. An Alabama jury found
against the Times, awarding Sullivan $500,000 in undifferentiated
94
compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court and the Ala95
bama Supreme Court both affirmed the jury’s verdict.
The Alabama libel tort at the time of Sullivan’s suit provided that
a plaintiff could only recover for statements of fact that were “of and
96
concerning” him. If such statements were found, and if they would
“tend to injure a person . . . in his reputation or to bring him into
public contempt,” for instance by “injur[ing] him in his public office,
or imput[ing] misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust,” they were libel per se and
97
presumed to be false. Once libel per se had been established, “general damages [were] presumed,” even if the plaintiff could not prove
98
pecuniary injury resulted from the statement. However, Alabama
law did not permit the award of punitive damages based on a presumption of injury alone; instead, it required a showing that the de99
fendant spoke with “actual malice.” Once a plaintiff had established
all the elements of a libel per se, the defendant could prevail only by
100
proving that the statements were true.
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
On review, the Supreme Court departed from its pattern of defining state action at a granular level. Instead, it defined the state action
under review at an unprecedentedly high level of generality, to include both the actual verdict and all of the abstract state private law
libel rules underlying the verdict. It declined to “insulate the judgment
of the Alabama court from constitutional scrutiny” because it was the
101
product of a private law allocation of rights and duties. It went on
to observe that the Alabama courts were wielding “a state rule of law”

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

LEWIS, supra note 90, at 12 (outlining the respondent, L.B. Sullivan’s complaints and the
newspaper’s subsequent response).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 267 (outlining Alabama libel law).
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
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which was alleged to have infringed upon constitutional rights. 102 After determining that both the judgment and the abstract body of libel
law were state action, it analyzed the constitutionality of both the enforcement action and the abstract rules. Ultimately, it both “reverse[d] the judgment” and “h[e]ld that the rule of law applied by
103
The Court then
the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient.”
supplied a new federal rule for libel cases and, rather than return the
matter to the Alabama court for reexamination of the facts under the
new scheme, disposed of the case itself, applying the scheme to the
104
record facts to conclude that Sullivan could not prevail.
In its constitutional analysis, the Court first purported to describe
105
“Alabama law as applied in this case.” According to the Court, Alabama law provided that statements indicating a public official lacked
integrity in carrying out his duties were libel per se: “[W]here the
plaintiff is a public official his place in the governmental hierarchy is
sufficient evidence to support a finding that his reputation has been
affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in
106
charge.” In other words, according to the Court, Alabama law provided that statements about municipal employees were considered to
identify the officials who oversaw those municipal departments, and
thus satisfied the crucial “of and concerning” element of defama107
tion. Notably, “this rule of liability” was not an accurate statement
of the abstract defamation law in Alabama. While the state supreme
court was willing to find that statements about the police were statements about Sullivan, there was no Alabama rule of law requiring that
result. In essence, the Supreme Court recategorized the state judicial
application of the “of and concerning rule” to these facts as an abstract
rule of law.
Further, the Court said that in Alabama, once libel per se had
been established, truth was the defendant’s only recourse; general
102
103

104
105
106
107

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 264. The Times’s attorney, Herbert Wechsler, recognized that the Court would
have to clear the state action hurdle in order to reach the First Amendment ground on
which he preferred to contest the Alabama verdict, and Sullivan had explicitly argued in
his brief to the Court that the Alabama rules of law were not state action. See David A.
Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 66 ALA. L. REV. 229, 237 nn.54–56 (2014). Wechsler treated
the argument “dismissively,” by grouping the Sullivan verdict with other state judicial orders the Court had recently denominated state action. Wechsler glossed over the fact
that those ostensibly comparable cases involved the courts’ authority to issue contempt citations and to enforce verdicts and were therefore inapposite. Id. at 238 n.60.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284–88.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 263.
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damages were presumed even without evidence of injury; a showing
of ill intent was required for the imposition of punitive damages; and
a showing of good motives did not foreclose the imposition of puni108
tive damages, but only mitigated them. The Court then defined the
question in the case as “whether this rule of liability”—essentially, the
109
entire Alabama libel tort—was constitutional.
The Court answered that question by articulating a set of defamation rules that would carve out of private law a safe harbor for speech
on public issues, and worked backwards from that ideal rule to see if
Alabama defamation law complied. Specifically, the Court announced that in libel actions brought by public officials, the Constitution required that “[the] public official [cannot] recover[] damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
110
In essence, the Court’s holding in Sullivan devised a
false or not.”
bright-line, speech-protective rule for finding actual malice, an element that was key to many state defamation schemes, but that was
given widely different substantive and procedural meaning by each
111
For instance, Alabama had required proof of “actual
jurisdiction.
malice” in defamation actions, but only as a prerequisite to recover112
Further, Alabama’s version of “actual maling punitive damages.
ice” was designed to capture general ill will, and therefore juries were
instructed that any intent to defame could satisfy the “actual malice”
113
standard. The Court determined that Alabama’s flexible commonlaw standard for actual malice, restricted to the evaluation of plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive damages, was inconsistent with the federal requirement. It was therefore unconstitutional, and was replaced by the new federal constitutional rule. The Court proceeded
to apply that rule to the evidence contained in the record of the case
and rendered a new verdict: “the proof presented to show actual

108
109
110

111
112
113

Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 279–80. Notably, the practical effect of the Court’s decision was to supply the
standard of “actual malice.” Alabama had in the past allowed juries to find intent and
award punitive damages when the jury found that the speaker was more than negligent
and circumstances suggested intent to defame, id. at 262, but the Court issued a rule dictating that “intent” to defame existed only where the speaker knew he was circulating a
falsehood or recklessly disregarded that possibility. Id. at 279–80.
See supra note 89.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
See, e.g., Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (Ala. 1960).
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malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard
114
demands . . .” and the judgment was reversed.
The Court’s state action definition was a subtle but crucial move
that yielded the unprecedented degree of remedial authority on display in the remainder of the opinion. If the Court had approached
Sullivan as it approached other constitutional challenges to private
law verdicts, it would have done one of three things: (1) defined the
relevant state action as the verdict alone and refused to enforce the
verdict if it represented a message-oriented imposition on speech
(without reaching into state private law principles and rewriting them
to avoid future instances of speech inhibition) as in Shelley and Peterson; (2) defined the relevant state action as the jury’s and courts’ application of the Alabama defamation elements to the facts and remanded for a more constitutionally scrupulous application of those
principles (again without reaching into state private law principles
115
and rewriting them), as in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.; or (3)
defined the relevant state action as the entirety of the background
private law of defamation and then asked whether it was designed to
achieve a neutral state interest or was designed to achieve an impermissible speech abridgment (reaching into state private law but presuming constitutionality so long it was not designed specifically to
achieve an impermissible end) as in Evans v. Abney and Cohen v.
116
Cowles Media Co.
114
115

116

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86.
458 U.S. 886 (1982). Notably, after replacing Alabama’s defamation scheme with its own,
the Court indicated that the traditional and modest state action analysis would also have
justified reversing the verdict. Following state action approach (2) above, the Court observed that the jury and judges had misapplied the existing Alabama rule of law that the
statement must be “of and concerning” the plaintiff. The evidence on that element was
“constitutionally defective” because it did not support the jury’s finding that the statements in the ad were “of and concerning” Sullivan. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288. It noted
that the Alabama Supreme Court had found the statements to satisfy that element because it is “common knowledge” that fire and police departments are under the control
of officials, so that criticisms of the department employees amount to criticism of the officials. Id. at 263. The Court then directed that “such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those operations.” Id. at 292.
Abney and Cohen suggest that rules of neutral design (those not calculated to infringe a
constitutional right but to achieve some other legitimate state goal) are presumed constitutional absent a biased application. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991);
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). Although the jury in Sullivan undoubtedly applied
the Alabama rules in bad faith to infringe a constitutional right, the rules themselves were
arguably neutral because they did not “single out” the press or individual speakers to prevent publication of particular content; rather, they singled out injuries caused by circulation of falsehoods regardless of the specific content of the falsehood. The Alabama libel
tort was not an ex ante law designed to foreclose select messages unlike, say “food libel”
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The first two of those state action approaches had the capacity to
yield the same result for the New York Times (operating on the untested assumption that the Alabama players would have acted in good
faith on remand). But neither of these approaches would not have
allowed the Court to reach into the abstract rules of private law and
recast them to its own liking. Departing from the unarticulated prudential practice of conceptualizing state action narrowly, the Court
deliberately defined state action in a way that aggrandized its remedial authority. This broad definition resulted in exactly the separation
of powers and federalism excesses that prudential principles in the
Article III context are designed to prevent. In Sullivan and dozens of
cases that followed, the Court used its newly located authority over
dignitary tort to displace the existing private law and to impose a rad117
ically different uniform national scheme.

117

laws, which were adopted explicitly to allow punishment of speech harmful to a specific
constituency. But see Howard M. Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech Protection: Free Speech
Through the Prism of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 323, 345,
374–75 (2000) (suggesting that both food libel laws and general defamation causes of action are content-based restrictions). Dignitary tort law generally is agnostic as to what
types of messages will attach liability or what kinds of plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for dignitary injury. The elements in these torts that evaluate the content of speech
(“defamatoriness” in defamation, “outrageousness” in IIED, and “offensiveness” in publication of private facts) do not supply any rules about approved or disapproved messages.
Instead, they indicate that for each tort, whether the content of the speech is sufficiently
injurious to have invaded the plaintiff’s legally protected interest in reputation, emotional well-being or privacy will be determined with reference to community norms. See infra
note 127. As a result, they can plausibly be described as “neutral” in design, though some
would disagree.
See David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 784
(2004) (discussing how “speech-tort conflicts become rules of constitutional law, not tort
law”). As Anderson suggests, the progressive constitutionalization of dignitary tort law is
reflected in many cases following Sullivan. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967) (applying Sullivan requirements to public figures in addition to public officials); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (applying the actual malice requirement to
the false light invasion of privacy tort); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (requiring plaintiff to prove actual malice by showing that the defendant knew or had serious doubts about the truth of his statement); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6 (1970) (barring recovery for rhetorical hyperbole); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring private plaintiffs to show actual malice in order to recover
presumed or punitive damages); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)
(shifting from defendant to plaintiff the burden of proving a statement false); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (applying the actual malice requirement to
the IIED tort); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (barring recovery for misquotations that do not materially alter the speaker’s meaning).
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III. SULLIVAN AND THE CLASH OF COMMUNITIES
Why did the Justices depart so drastically in Sullivan from their
prudential state action pattern? The orthodox answer is that the
Court considered speech (and the civil rights context of the case) sufficiently special that it justified the strong medicine of Sullivan. But
on closer examination, it does not appear that a love of speech alone
is a satisfactory explanation for the state action departure in Sullivan.
A better explanation may be that Sullivan for the first time offered
the Court a chance to provide a legal framework for weighing the
relative priority of local communities and the national community
when the two were in conflict and the Constitution offered no clear
hierarchy between them.
A. Debunking the Intuitive Explanations for the Anomaly
The simplest and most obvious explanation for the Court’s decision to define state action broadly and thus maximize its leverage to
change those rules is that speech deserves special protection. This
explanation is certainly plausible; many theorists consider uncontro118
versial the assertion that “speech is special.” However, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory if Sullivan and its progeny are synthesized with comparable cases involving constitutional challenges to
private law actions.
In a number of those cases, private law interests have pressured
speech and the Court has nevertheless defined state action at a granular level, limiting its remedial leverage. In Peterson v. City of Greenville, where private law property concepts undergirding the state law
of trespass sat opposite the rights of civil rights protesters to stage sitins, the Court defined state action to include just the trespass convictions and left undisturbed the private law of property that allowed liability for speakers who brought their message onto private do119
mains. Too, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., where the right of
a business owner to sue for malicious interference with his commerce
sat opposite the rights of civil rights protesters to carry out a boycott,
the Court defined the relevant state action as the application of tort
principles to the specific facts of the case and remanded for reconsideration in light of a gentle reminder about the value of speech,
without suggesting that the malicious interference tort itself was in

118
119

See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 991 (1997).
373 U.S. 244, 247–48 (1963).
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need of revision. 120 Finally, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Court
permitted application of promissory estoppel principles even though
that decision had the speech-abridging potential to punish a newspa121
Nevertheless, the Court
per for revealing an anonymous source.
defined the relevant state action as the neutral application of promissory estoppel rules to the facts at hand and thus sacrificed the constitutional leverage to promulgate a constitutional rule shaping promissory estoppel analysis to protect the news media from liability.
The compelling civil rights background of Sullivan the case is a second intuitive explanation for the Court’s singular state action analysis in the case. But it, too, falls short. In Shelley and Barrows, the
Court addressed the ugly and not uncommon practice of private restrictive covenants designed to create all-white enclaves in local
neighborhoods, and it restricted its state action analysis to the three
122
Consequently, when it found the injunctions
contracts before it.
and damage award enforcing those contracts unconstitutional, it
123
simply reversed or affirmed them in a binary fashion. But because
it did not sweep within its review the entirety of the state private law
of contract that gave rise to the covenants, it left those principles undisturbed. It could have declared as a matter of private contract law
that such instruments were per se unconscionable, which would have
been the contract result most analogous to the Court’s holding in Sullivan that Alabama’s libel scheme (and any others like it) was uncon124
stitutional and thus displaced. It did not.
The Peterson and Bell trespass cases were also outgrowths of the civil rights movement, both finding protesters to have trespassed on pri120

121

122
123
124

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982). See also Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977) (holding that the tort protected
a person’s commercial interests in his act so that liability was warranted even if it was a
speech abridgment, where a man sued a local television news station under the invasion
of privacy tort for filming and broadcasting his “human cannonball” act).
501 U.S. 663, 668–69 (1991). The inconsistency in application of the First Amendment to
contract-based challenges to speech and tort-based challenges to speech has been documented, with predictions that the two lines of authority must eventually collide and be resolved. See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (2009) (noting the “dramatic difference” between the
First Amendment’s treatments of contract and of tort).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 251–54
(1953).
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 12–14; Barrows, 346 U.S. at 260.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). Functionally, these holdings
were sufficient to make the practice unappealing to parties. Shelley is often said to have
“prohibited” racially restrictive covenants; however, Shelley explicitly did not prohibit
them, but it did not have to encroach on state private law prerogatives to achieve the instrumental goal of discouraging the practice. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
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vate property. But the state action in Peterson was restricted to the individual trespass convictions, and the Court in Bell declined to even
125
Finally, in NAACP v.
find the convictions to be state action.
Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court defined the relevant state action as
the application of private law malicious interference principles to the
specific facts of the civil rights boycott involved in the case, reversed
the judgment insofar as it applied to respondents it found to have
engaged in expression but not violence, and remanded for application of those rules to select respondents who appeared to have used
or threatened violence in light of a gentle reminder about constitu126
tional values. It did not, however, define the state action to include
the entirety of the malicious interference tort, and was therefore unable to employ any constitutional authority to displace that state tort
rule.
In short, if enthusiasm for speech or for civil rights were the only
factors influencing the Court’s state action approach in mediating
the clash between private law and public law, all cases where speech
or civil rights sat opposite a private law interest would be expected to
feature a highly generalized definition of the relevant state action
and a rewrite of the private law to privilege speech and subordinate
the private law interest. But that has not resulted. So the interests sitting on the public law side of the ledger—speech or civil rights—do
not seem to be the crucial factor leading to the Court’s anomalous
treatment of state action in the Sullivan line of cases.
B. The Community-Centered Explanation for Sullivan
The private law system involved in the case best explains the
Court’s doctrinal departure. The dignitary torts are unique in their
explicit invocation of community values to determine the defendant’s
127
Sociologists define community to include groups with a
liability.
125

126
127

See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 245 (1963); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 241 (1964). Christopher Schmidt has observed that while the Court first started taking cases challenging the constitutionality of segregationists’ various tactics in order to
thwart the civil rights movement, the Court gradually adopted a more flexible approach
to state action precisely to permit wider application of constitutional principles to actors
other than elected officials. He describes Bell as the failure of this state action “revolution.” Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-ins and the Failed State Action Revolution 19 (May 12,
2008) (Am. Bar Found. Working Paper).
458 U.S. at 915–16 & 916 n.51, 924–34.
Property and contract feature largely objective rules and other tort actions smuggle in
subjective community values at most indirectly, for example via reference to “reasonableness” in negligence. The dignitary causes of action, in contrast, all delegate to the community the job of determining whether particular speech events have inflicted negative
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common nucleus of practice as well as a common geographic circum128
stance. While “community” had a fairly stable and unitary meaning
throughout most of the history of the dignitary torts, by 1964 the
term failed to adequately account for the complex network of social
organizations in the United States. In addition to the paradigmatic
homogenous agrarian community that had provided dignitary tort
norms since the founding, by the mid-twentieth century, the United
States was also home to diverse urban communities, professional and
commercial communities, and—thanks to technological innovations
such as telegraphs, telephones, televisions, automobiles, airplanes,
and industrial printing presses—a national community had also coalesced. As a result, the unsupervised use of such an open-ended metric of wrongfulness empowered juries from discrete and insular
communities to apply their values to punish speech that might be
considered acceptable by other subsidiary communities or by the national community. So Sullivan’s state action analysis and the attendant federalization of dignitary tort law may be best explained as
an effort to constitutionally subordinate local communities to the national community in the private law context where they were most
likely to conflict. This hypothesis is borne out both by history and by
the Court’s own language in this line of cases.

128

externalities that trigger, under local norms, a compensatory obligation on the part of
the speaker. For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifies, “To create liability for defamation there must be . . . a false and defamatory statement concerning another . . . .” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts also defines “defamatory communication” as tending “to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977) (emphasis
added). The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort requires that the defendant
exhibit “extreme and outrageous conduct,” defined as behavior that, when recounted “to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1977) (emphasis
added). The privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts specifies, “One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that . . . would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). The Restatement specifically says
that “The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the
customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and
fellow citizens.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 28 (1st ed. 1985); David B. Clark, The Concept of Community: A Re-Examination, 21 SOC. REV. 397–8 (1973).
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1. The Two-Tiered Notion of Community in the United States
In the pre-industrial, agrarian, patriarchal, and religious era, one
was more likely to find homogeneity among large groups of people, a
129
“In the pre-modern world,
state of being denoted as Gemeinschaft.
knowledge about how one should live—that is, ethical knowledge
about what constitutes ‘the good life’—was derived from the structures of tradition and, especially, religion that dominated communi130
ties.” Because these communities depended on social cohesion and
because participation in the mercantile economy depended on one’s
personal reputation, defamation was a crucial device for vindicating
reputational slights in a peaceful forum.
In contrast, the post-Industrial age saw the emergence of a
Gesellschaft community, where social bonds are “impersonal and spe131
cialized.” “The fundamental source of knowledge about the physical and human world [in these communities is] reason—that is, the
capacity of individual human beings to know truth through inde132
Because rational thinking and the
pendent and critical thought.”
maximization of knowledge are valued in Gesellschaft communities,
the freedom of individuals to express and receive ideas via free
speech is prized.
During the late eighteenth century, the United States can be described as a collection of largely Gemeinschaft communities. Most
states allowed common law causes of action for defamation during
the early years of the Republic, and this tort scheme was not seen as
inconsistent with either state or federal constitutional protections for
133
Further, during this period, speech was
free press or free speech.
either conducted face-to-face, via personal letters, or in newspapers
134
that tended to circulate locally. Thus, most dignitary tort causes of
action during the early period of the Republic were inherently con-

129
130
131
132
133

134

See LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 24 (2007) (describing the theories of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies).
Id. at 23.
Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 501 (2011).
MCNAMARA, supra note 129, at 23.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When
the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 43–46 (2008) (describing how a huge number of
states explicitly contemplated libel suits in their state constitutions).
See Andrew J. King, The Law of Slander in Early Antebellum America, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1,
7 (1991) (explaining that slander, which “regulated face-to-face interaction in small
communities,” was far more prevalent in the nineteenth century than libel, which typically involved conflicts between rival politicians).
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tained within cohesive local communities with shared practices and
135
shared norms.
The emergence of the Gesellschaft community in the United States
coincided with the introduction of industrialized printing presses,
136
Further, it coincidtelegraphs, telephones, radios, and televisions.
ed with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reinforced the primacy of national values over local values in some con137
Thus, the emergence of a national, individualistic, liberal
texts.
democratic ethos was symbiotic with the flourishing of mass-produced
national speech.
This tension in the notion of “community” may go a long way in
explaining the Court’s radical state action analysis in Sullivan and the
138
Geographic
resulting constitutionalization of the dignitary torts.
135

136

137

138

See, e.g., LAWHORNE, supra note 89, at 174 (noting that of those considered “public officials” with limited recourse to defamation in the pre-Sullivan years, most were state and
local officials: grand juror, city inspector, city street superintendent, prison warden, policeman, mental institution superintendent, poorhouse manager, and state oil inspector.
Only one listed was a federal official whose work would have an impact across state lines,
an agency secretary).
See generally NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 141–42 (1986) (explaining the rise of fast communication
devices).
In fact, one of the underlying purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment can be described
as an imposition of privileged cultural values (those of the northern states, which were
less agrarian and more impersonal) over disfavored values (those of the southern states,
which were more agrarian and interconnected) through the structural privileging of the
federal government over the state governments. Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 499 (2003) (“The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . realized that the right to the Equal Protection of the Laws would require courts to impose
the cultural values of the North upon the South.”). While this rebalancing allowed the
central government to impose cultural norms of liberal egalitarian rights via constitutional adjudication of provisions like the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment does
not allow for the law to resolve cultural conflicts in public discourse by enforcing “cultural norms.” Id. Post seems to be suggesting that top-down imposition of nationalized
norms entrenched in the Fourteenth Amendment is inconsistent with a liberal democratic reading of the First Amendment (not, of course, the only possible theory that can be
used to interpret the Constitution). See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or
Classical Liberal Construction? 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 824–25 (2014) (explaining Richard Epstein’s view of the Constitution). But Post does not foreclose the possibility that
bottom-up signaling of the norms of local, non-governmental communities via the common law is consistent with the First Amendment. See id. at 824 (discussing the norms surrounding the interpretation of the Constitution).
See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Scalia, Originalism, and the First Amendment, HUFFINGTON
POST (OCT. 13, 2011, 7:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/justicescalia-originalis_b_1009944.html (reporting Justice Scalia’s contention, at an Aspen Institute conference, that the Court-legislated press protections in Sullivan were not compelled by the Constitution). Stone suggested the disconnect between national norms (ostensibly represented by the Times’s approach to the story) and Alabama norms
(represented by the jury verdict for Sullivan) was the key dynamic motivating the Court’s
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communities have long been assigned responsibility for determining
norm-based wrongfulness in the dignitary torts because they share
history, geography, weather, cultural and civic institutions, and educational and charitable endeavors. This common nucleus of experience and practice means that “community” members are positioned
to understand what behavior is expected of participants based on
what the community has jointly emphasized as important. For instance, calling a plaintiff a “scab” might be seen as defamatory in a locality like Detroit, which has a high concentration of union members,
whereas it might not be defamatory in a right-to-work state where un139
ion membership has little social support.
Dignitary tort law is premised on the legitimacy of the Gemeinschaft
community, whereas the liberal democratic theory that drives much
of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the legitimacy of the Gesellschaft community. In Sullivan, the tort explicitly invoked “community” norms to determine wrongfulness, revealing a
fault line in tort between Gemeinschaft norms and Gesellschaft norms.
Where a plaintiff suing for dignitary tort asks a geographically local jury to apply its notions of wrongfulness to national speech, the
imposition of “community” values may vault geographically and morally discrete (Gemeinschaft) communities over the national
(Gesellschaft) community for purposes of constructing speech norms.
The moralistic and often religious cohesion of subsidiary local communities raises the possibility that speech considered acceptable by a
national majority or acceptable within some subsidiary communities

139

decision. Id. (“This was a lawsuit in Alabama, decided under Alabama law by an Alabama
jury. The New York legislature was completely powerless to affect the matter in any way.
It was precisely this fact that made a constitutional decision necessary. It’s bad enough
that Alabama wants to censor what its own citizens can read, but what the situation in
New York Times v. Sullivan demonstrated was that the nation cannot constitutionally allow each state to censor speech on its own, because in a national marketplace of ideas
censorship in one state effectively precludes the press from distributing news to people
nationally. Although only a few hundred copies of that issue of the New York Times actually found their way into Alabama, that gave Alabama sufficient leverage to impose a huge
penalty on the Times that was designed to deter it from writing negative stories about the
South generally.”).
Absent a jury instruction to the contrary, dignitary torts will almost inevitably be decided
with reference to local community norms because the vicinage requirement draws jurors
from a geographically compact area within which the case is being litigated. Indeed, the
basis for the vicinage requirement is that jurors discharge their duties in part by using the
“assorted store of information [they] acquire[] about [their] neighborhood[s] by living
there—local community customs, problems and affairs, local geography—and the jurors’
contacts with other community members . . . .” Dale W. Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage
Requirement: An Empirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REV. 99, 101 (1966) (finding that “[j]uror
knowledge of local conditions played a part in the decisions reached in ten of the fourteen civil cases” studied).
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will be denominated as wrongful by the norms of the particular
140
Thus, where the
community within which the tort is adjudicated.
configuration of a plaintiff and a defendant results in a Gesellschaft v.
Gemeinschaft community conflict, the Court seemed to fear that
nothing in tort doctrine would prevent local juries from using their
141
“community” discretion to override national speech values.
This fear seems to be a plausible explanation for the Court’s selfaggrandizing definition of the state action under review in Sullivan.
By defining the relevant state action at a high level of generality, the
Court was able to do two things: first, it clearly signaled that in a
clash between national community values and subsidiary community
values, national values should prevail; second, it operationalized that
rule (in Sullivan and dozens of subsequent cases) by promulgating
the quasi-legislative constitutional scheme that would divert to public
law treatment most cases where subsidiary communities might punish

140

141

See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 41 (1996) (“[The use of the ‘community’ concept to assess the wrongfulness of
speech-inflicted injuries] fails to comport with the complex reality of modern community
life. The vision of community underpinning defamation law is based on a very simple,
traditional model of social life—a model that is contrary to the prevailing forms of social
interaction in American society. It is possible to speak of widespread consensus only in
small, closely knit, and relatively homogeneous communities (if they exist). In contrast,
American society might be described as a community of subcommunities, undergoing a
constant process of formation and reformation.”). Thus, the call for civility via dignitary
tort verdicts “may mask a desire to suppress dialogue that seems threatening to the established social order.” See id. at 41 n.239.
If so, the Court’s fears may have been overblown. Tort does feature internal limits that
prevent it from becoming a wholesale tool of public policy (a feature that is seen as a
blessing by some tort theorists and an obstacle to others). See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 131,
at 475–77 (summarizing internal tort limits such as the requirement of substantive standing, the refusal to recognize unrealized injuries, and reluctance to award damages for
emotional and economic harm). Notably, Alabama tort doctrine already did include two
elements that should have prevented local jury override of national values. First, the “of
and concerning” element of Alabama law required the plaintiff to prove substantive
standing to contest the national speech. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Second, under Alabama law the jury was required to explicitly find that the Times had acted
with “malice” in order to award punitive damages. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text. Conceptualizing the relevant state action to include the verdict alone would have allowed the Court to police the jury’s application of these elements and overturn the verdict for failure to abide by them. Interestingly, the civil recourse theory of torts has noted
in response to complaints that tort has been manipulated as a tool for achieving public
policy ends that internal limits within tort doctrine, if applied properly, prevent the use of
tort as a species of public law. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as
Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945–46 (2010). Specifically, Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky have noted that tort has internal “standing” requirements that prevent its use by
plaintiffs who have not sustained an actual injury. The “of and concerning” requirement
is the internal standing limit that should have ensured the defamation tort could not be
used by the Alabama jury as an at-large device for punishing the Times’s speech.
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significant speech. Thus, by ignoring the prudential practice of defining state action modestly, the Court reached horizontally into the
legislative prerogative to devise rules that balance public welfare and
speech rights, and reached vertically into the states’ prerogative to
develop tort law in accord with their unique cultures. The promise of
Sullivan is found in the Court’s signal that subsidiary communities
may not dictate national speech norms. But the reason that promise
has not been entirely fulfilled may be found in the imprudent state
action analysis that authorized the Court’s horizontal and vertical excesses.
IV. THE COURT’S DIGNITARY TORT LAWMAKING
In the two decades following Sullivan, the Court overreached horizontally into the legislative domain, fashioning an entirely new
142
scheme to govern defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of
143
emotional distress causes of action. The Court’s exertions were decidedly more legislative than adjudicatory in nature. The lawmaking
endeavor is typically marked by the development of general rules by a
body that has autonomy to identify problems it will address and to de144
fine the “breadth and severity” of those problems as it wishes, after
whatever investigation or factfinding it elects to conduct, subject only
145
to eventual response by voters. Adjudication, on the other hand, is
marked by “particularized administration of justice in individual cas146
es,” in reaction to problems identified and bounded by the dispu147
In this instance, however, the Court’s actions have all the
tants.
earmarks of legislating: it developed general rules to govern future
cases after having defined the breadth and the severity of the social
problem generally, far beyond the boundaries that had been identified by the parties. Specifically, it designed a scheme that is quasi142
143

144
145
146
147

See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380, 386 (1967) (addressing the right to privacy for a
public figure).
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (limiting the intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort for public figures). While using “falsity” as a basis for
distinguishing between intent to speak and intent to injure may be workable for the false
light invasion of privacy tort, it is not a good fit for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort, where even true speech may be deemed so outrageous for contextual reasons that it is intolerable and therefore subject to liability.
Thomas D. Barton, Common Law and its Substitutes: The Allocation of Social Problems to Alternative Decisional Institutions, 63 N.C. L. REV. 519, 521 (1985).
See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 299–300
(1992).
Id. at 266.
Barton, supra note 144, at 521–22.
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statutory in nature, establishing ex ante categories of plaintiffs and
categories of wrongfulness that, when cross-referenced, dictate the
appropriate rule of liability. This categorical scheme was designed to
protect democratically important speech while preserving a plaintiff
remedy for speech that is less significant or more injurious. However,
the inconsistency and imprecision of the scheme it produced reflect
148
the perils of straying outside its area of institutional competence.
A. The Court’s Categorical Scheme
The Court’s dignitary tort rules are both substantive and procedural in nature. The most important substantive rule created one legal category for “public” plaintiffs and a separate category for “private” plaintiffs. Although falsehood is an element in all defamation
claims, the Court added to the “falsehood” element for public plaintiffs a stringent scienter requirement. Specifically, to recover for any
of these dignitary torts, public plaintiffs must show that speakers had
“actual malice,” defined as knowledge that their statements are false
149
Private plaintiffs also must
or reckless disregard of that possibility.
prove the defendants’ scienter, but at the lower threshold of negli150
gence (unless seeking punitive damages, which require actual mal151 152
ice ).
Further, to bolster the requirement that defendants in public
plaintiff cases must have actual malice, and the requirement that the
complained-of speech be false, the Court overhauled the procedural
framework for defamation and the related torts. Specifically, plain153
tiffs must show the speaker’s scienter by clear and convincing proof,
and the reviewing court must review the scienter finding de novo ra154
Most important, defamation plaintiffs
ther than for clear error.

148

149
150
151
152

153
154

Notably, unlike a legislature, the Court does not have the ability to undertake any
factfinding to confirm its intuitions about the scope of a problem, and is not accountable
to any other branch or constituency that may object to its efforts.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
Id. at 349–50.
Id.
In addition to from introducing a public-private distinction, the Court also changed the
calculus for a “defamatory” statement. As a matter of law, rhetorical hyperbole, Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), opinion, Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1990), and immaterial misquotations, Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 524 (1991), cannot be the basis for a successful defamation claim.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–286 (1964).
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492 (1984).
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must now prove the statement to be false, rather than the defendant
155
shouldering the burden to prove it true.
156
These rules essentially establish a constitutional matrix. The nature of the plaintiff operates as an objective proxy for the constitutional significance of the contested speech. Statements about a public official or public figure are thought to represent democratically or
civically relevant speech, whereas statements about purely private figures are thought to represent speech of insignificant democratic or
157
civic value and can expose the declarant to tort liability more freely.
Further, the scienter categories operate as objective proxies for the
likelihood that the speaker’s words were calculated primarily to circulate a message rather than to inflict injury. Statements that are knowingly or recklessly false are presumed to have been motivated by intent to injure whereas statements that are just negligently false reflect
intent to circulate a message. These categories of plaintiff status and
defendant scienter work in tandem so that plaintiffs suing for speech
presumed to be of democratic or civic value must demonstrate a level
of scienter on the defendant’s part indicating the speech was more
injury-oriented than message-oriented. This categorical scheme was
meant to ensure that democratically important speech intended to
enlighten rather than to injure could not be the basis for an award of
money damages. In other words, the scheme is meant to create per
se constitutional “breathing room” for certain favored kinds of
158
speech.
155
156

157

158

Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
Others have used this term. See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 1, at 375 n.189; Rodney
A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle:
A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 502 n.26 (2013).
See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343–45 (explaining that Sullivan was designed to accommodate
the press interest in protection from liability for circulating robust speech with the state
interest in protecting the reputation of various individuals from injury, and that in order
to avoid case-by-case review of specific verdicts, the Court laid down rules that would
strike the appropriate balance by treating the category of public plaintiffs less protectively
than the category of private plaintiffs in light of the different speech-reputation policies
at play for the different plaintiff categories); see also Smolla, supra note 156, at 511–13.
Notably, the Court’s detailed dignitary tort rules, designed as a national scheme to replace a variety of state defamation and dignitary tort rules, look suspiciously like the “federal general common law” ostensibly prohibited in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938). To be sure, Erie reserved a power for the Court to supervise the judicial action
of the states when authorized by the Constitution to do so. But the negative command of
the First Amendment bars the promulgation of positive law shaping speech. By replacing
problematic state rules of tort with its own rules of tort, one might say that the Court has
used a constitutional prohibition on the development of speech law as a pretext for developing speech law. Of course, constitutional interpretation remains the clear province
of the Court even after Erie. But scholars have acknowledged that “interpretation” can
almost imperceptibly morph into “promulgation” of common law in constitutional cloth-
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B. The Pitfalls of Constitutional Legislating
The Court’s foremost goal in establishing constitutional categories
for these torts was to distinguish neatly between speech entitled to
public law protections and speech that should remain subject to private law. But the post-Sullivan dignitary tort cases are an object lesson
in the Court’s legislative inexperience. While the Court has elegantly
articulated the need to balance speech and dignity, the rules it has
promulgated are inconsistent and imprecise.
1. Inconsistency.
The Court’s drawn-out effort to perfect a constitutional dignitary
tort scheme has been plagued by indecision about how to distinguish
between plaintiffs who must proceed under the public law protections and those who may remain within private law. The Court has
also been unclear about whether different defendants are to be funneled into different parts of the constitutional matrix.
The Court’s dignitary tort project began simply enough, with its
Sullivan announcement that defamation actions by public officials
would henceforth be subject to constitutional oversight. Just three
years later, the Court expanded the category of plaintiffs subject to
159
constitutional oversight to include public figures. Four years later,
it expanded the category of plaintiffs subject to constitutional requirements once more to include all those suing about speech on
matters of public concern regardless of whether they personally were
160
But three years after that sweeping
categorized as public figures.
161
It concluded that
rule was announced, the Court backtracked.

159
160
161

ing. Writing as the Court completed its first phase of constitutionalizing defamation in
Gertz, Henry Monaghan asked, “Can the Court . . . create a sub-order of ‘quasiconstitutional’ law—of a remedial, substantive, and procedural character—to vindicate
constitutional liberties?” Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975). He suggested that once the
Court has explicated general values, the burden shifts to the states to develop rules that
realize those values; the Court can invalidate those rules on a case-by-case basis if the rules
fall short of the constitutional goal, but the Court cannot “insist upon adherence to constitutionally inspired, but not compelled, rules without considering as decisive whether
the state has provided minimally satisfactory alternatives . . . .” Id. Notably, Justice Byron
White has been described as losing faith in Sullivan in large part because it spawned a
“federal common law of defamation” that inserted the Court into the business of regulating speech. John C. P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice
White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (2003).
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160–61 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.)
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
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stretching the public law treatment of dignitary injuries to speech on
all matters of public concern would leave many plaintiffs unable to
162
vindicate their interests. Therefore, in Gertz v. Welch, the Court set163
tled on a rule requiring only public plaintiffs to show actual malice.
Although it appeared to finalize the categorization of plaintiffs in
Gertz, the Court destabilized the scheme ten years later, in Dun &
164
Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. There, the Court was asked
whether the heightened scienter requirement of Gertz and Sullivan
applied to matters of purely private concern. The Court answered
the question in the negative. The holding created a firm safe harbor
from constitutional speech protection for matters of private concern.
But this formulation left available by implication the possibility that
in all matters of public concern, even involving only private figures,
165
For instance, in
the heightened intent requirements applied.
Snyder v. Phelps, the Court overturned an IIED verdict in large part
because the defendant’s speech was deemed to be on a matter of
166
public concern, even though the plaintiff was a private figure.
The Court’s constitutional scheme has also been ambiguous on
the question of whether to apply different scienter requirements
based on the identity of the defendant. For instance, in drafting its
opinion Dun & Bradstreet, the Court debated but did not resolve
whether the heightened culpability requirements for defamation recovery should be reserved for cases brought only against media de167
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor raised the possibility of a
fendants.

162
163

164

165

166

167

Id. (“The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would
abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.”)
Id. at 334, 344–47, 352 (“We are persuaded that the trial court did not err in refusing to
characterize petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this litigation. We therefore
conclude that the New York Times standard is inapplicable to this case . . . .”).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (“In light of
the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we
hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”).
See, e.g., Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark That Wasn’t: A First Amendment
Play in Five Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 74 (2013) (noting that Rehnquist realized that he
was drawing a distinction between matters of private concern and other matters—a distinction the Court rejected in Gertz, which focused on public verse private figures).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a
public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’
under the First Amendment. . . . [T]he jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro
for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.”).
See e.g., Levine & Wermiel, supra note 165, at 48–52 (describing the debate in Dun over
whether the Sullivan scheme had been or should be reserved for media defendants only
in order to allow significant speech to flourish while permitting plaintiff recovery for
harmful, but presumably less democratically important, non-media speech).
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media/non-media distinction again in Philadelphia Newspapers v.
168
Hepps, again without providing a clear resolution of the question.
The Court’s prudential state action analysis typically restricts the
Justices to adjudication rather than lawmaking. Disregarding that
prudential practice in the line of cases from Sullivan and Snyder, the
Court has attempted to establish a categorical, quasi-legislative
scheme of dignitary tort. The result demonstrates that the Court is
not well-suited to legislative pronouncements. Devising this scheme
via common-law decisionmaking techniques has meant that rules
emerge by half-measure and change with the Court’s composition,
leaving both speakers and subjects of speech uncertain how to negotiate the inevitable clashes between their interests.
2. Imprecision
Aside from vacillating about which plaintiffs’ cases should be diverted for heightened constitutional scrutiny, the Court has also
failed to clearly denominate how plaintiffs are divided among the
public and private categories. Over time, the Court has identified
five distinct categories of plaintiffs, but it has left the boundaries between these categories vague and manipulable. Because this categorization is essential to determining whether the plaintiff’s cause of action will be subject to enhanced constitutional oversight, imprecise
boundaries send mixed signals about the reach of constitutional
principles into the tort realm.
The Court in Gertz outlined five distinct categories of dignitary
tort plaintiff: the public official, the all-purpose public figure, the
limited-purpose public figure, the involuntary public figure, and the
169
private figure. At the same time, it rejected the notion that private
figure defamation lawsuits could be subjected to enhanced constitutional scrutiny if the relevant speech covered a matter of public con168

169

Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986) (“We also have no occasion to consider the quantity of proof of falsity that a private-figure plaintiff must present
to recover damages. Nor need we consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff
sues a nonmedia defendant . . . .”). This ambiguity continues to plague defamation law,
particularly as hybrid speakers such as bloggers proliferate. If the heightened requirements apply only to press defendants, then courts hearing defamation cases must decide
whether blogger-defendants fit within that category or should be sent to the more tortfriendly non-media category. See, e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284,
1292 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because Cox’s blog post addressed a matter of public concern,
even assuming that Gertz is limited to such speech, the district court should have instructed the jury that it could not find Cox liable for defamation unless it found that she acted
negligently.”).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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cern. The Court has over time attempted to define the contours of
each category. Public officials “at the very least . . . [are] those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear
to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the
170
All-purpose public figures are
conduct of governmental affairs.”
those who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
171
These catethat they are deemed public figures for all purposes.”
gories are fairly easy to apply and there has been little controversy
about their application. However, the remaining three categories are
a quagmire. The Court has defined limited purpose public figures as
those who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in172
volved” and has stated that involuntary public figures are those who
become public “through no purposeful action of [their] own,” but
173
All public figures, whether all-purpose
will be “exceedingly rare.”
or involuntary, are required to conduct their tort suits under enhanced constitutional scrutiny. Private figures are those who have
“not accepted public office or assumed an ‘influential role in order174
ing society.’”
175
The definition of “involuntary” public figures suggests that the
plaintiff’s proximity to a person or issue that is public—even if remote, tangential, or unwilling—may render that person a public figure. This definition in effect opens a back door through which
speaker-defendants can rely on the public interest in their speech
about private figures to seek constitutional protection, even though
the Court explicitly disavowed the “public concern” test for the
176
constitutionalization of dignitary tort in Gertz. In fact, it took three
cases on the heels of Gertz to illustrate the narrowness of the “limited”
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result)).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
See, e.g., Gerard Magliocca, Involuntary Public Figures, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 13,
2013),
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/11/involuntary-public-figures.
html (noting that although the Supreme Court in Gertz predicted that “‘truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare[,]’ . . . [t]his statement is highly questionable.
There are lots of involuntary public figures today. Children of celebrities. Folks who are
exposed to scrutiny on social media. And so on. Yet the Court used this premise (few involuntary public figures) to support the point that involuntary public figures should be
treated like voluntary public figures (government officials or celebrities). Things are too
well settled, I suppose, to challenge this rule, but its foundation seems weaker.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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and “involuntary” public figure categories. It found in quick succes177
sion that the wife of the Firestone Tire heir, a man with ties to Sovi178
et spies, and a scientist who had accepted public funds and been
179
ridiculed by a U.S. Senator were all private figures.
Despite these examples, lower courts applying the Court’s definitions in recent years have given a far more capacious meaning to the
“public” categories, categorizing as “public” plaintiffs nearly indistinguishable from the wife, criminal suspect, and scientist found private
180
by the Court in the 1970s. This tendency may be attributed to the
difficulty in segregating public and private plaintiffs. Courts wishing
to avoid reversal on constitutional grounds will default to a “public”
categorization, meaning that the path of least resistance is to subject
plaintiffs bringing dignitary tort claims with any public dimension to
the constitutional tort requirements. Functionally, the “public concern” category rejected in Gertz has been subsumed into the “limited
purpose” and “involuntary” public figure categories, in large part be181
cause the Court’s categories were imprecise.
By defining state action very broadly in Sullivan, the Court invited
itself to legislate a speech-friendly dignitary tort scheme. This scheme
established ex ante categories of dignitary tort cases that were to be
diverted for constitutional protection. Unsurprisingly, this scheme
was riddled with inconsistencies and imprecision. As discussed below,
177

178
179

180

181

Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976) (“We hold respondent was not a ‘public
figure’ for the purpose of determining the constitutional protection afforded petitioner’s
report of the factual and legal basis of her divorce.”).
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979) (“Finally, we cannot agree that
Hutchinson had such access to the media that he should be classified as a public figure.
Hutchinson’s access was limited to responding to the announcement of the Golden
Fleece Award.”).
See, e.g., Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 532 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding anthrax specialist limited purpose public figure for purposes of media coverage on the search for the
perpetrator of anthrax mailings to federal officeholders); Zupnik v. Assoc. Press, 31 F.
Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding wife of a doctor who received a citation for
medical incompetence a public figure “by virtue of her marriage to [the doctor]”); Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding a security guard a “media hero” public figure because he granted many interviews and photo
shoots).
Distinguishing matters of “public concern” from those of “private concern” is no easier
than labeling plaintiffs “public” or “private.” The Court has acknowledged recently that
although protection for speech on matters of “public concern” grows, “‘the boundaries of
the public concern test are not well defined.’” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216
(2011) (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam)). See also
Mark Strasser, What’s It To You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 MO.
L. REV. 1083 (2012) (describing the development of the “matters of public concern” doctrine and arguing that the Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence must be clarified).
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the horizontal overreach resulting from the state action analysis in
Sullivan has diminished dignitary tort without noticeably enhancing
democratically relevant speech.
V. THE SUPPRESSION OF SUBSIDIARY COMMUNITIES
In addition to using Sullivan’s imprudent state action approach to
encroach horizontally on the legislative function, the Court used it to
overreach vertically and suppress subfederal units of political and social organization. Specifically, the Court has disempowered states by
imposing uniform federal tort rules and has disempowered local
communities by confining jury authority to decide questions of fact
with reference to local norms. Throughout this line of cases, the
Court
indicated
repeatedly
that
its
speech-friendly
constitutionalization of dignitary tort was motivated by a fear of cultural norms developed by subsidiary communities and at the state
level. While providing constitutional laws of substance and procedure for these torts, the Justices repeatedly expressed skepticism
about the parochialism and emotionality of juries and of subsidiary
communities generally. Notably, throughout these cases, the community-suppressing agenda has rarely commanded a majority of the
Court. As discussed below, each time the Court has rendered a decision privileging the national community, a number of Justices have
inevitably complained that the values of state autonomy and community responsiveness were being lost.
The decision in Sullivan to devise a constitutional dignitary tort
rule and to invalidate any inconsistent state tort schemes was a direct
suppression of state authority to develop its own private law. Historically, state defamation doctrines recognized some flexibility to allow
for free discussion of public affairs, but each state struck the speechreputation balance according to its own lights. For instance, preSullivan, Massachusetts common law provided that speakers were
immune from libel judgments when they engaged in comment and
criticism about officeholders, but not when their speech involved
182
In contrast, Oklahoma common law profalse statements of fact.
vided that speakers were privileged when engaging in fair comment
and criticism and when discussing matters of public interest so long as
they did so without malice and honestly believed their words to be
true, except that statements imputing criminal behavior were not covered by privilege; further, public officials had the burden of proving
182

LAWHORNE, supra note 89, at 135.
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the problematic statement false. 183 Before dignitary tort was constitutionalized, the right to set a locally appropriate speech-dignity balance was considered a state prerogative. In fact, state treatment of
this issue tended to reflect some geographic preferences, with Western states and several states on the East Coast carving out more room
for speech about public officials, and states in the Midwest and South
184
following more reputation-friendly rules.
Sullivan’s “actual malice” categorical scheme replaced these flexible measures with a blunt tool dictating how juries were to distinguish
between injury and message, with knowledge or recklessness acting as
a proxy—and an unprecedentedly speech-protective proxy—for in185
tent to injure. This voiding of the fifty individual state schemes and
replacement with a uniform federal scheme short-circuited the more
typical dialogue between state and federal government, in which the
Court articulates a principle and states are given leeway to develop
their own rules that conform to the principle. For instance, in the
punitive damages context, the Court has evolved over time from articulating general principles towards offering increasingly specific
proscriptions. It has not, however, in the course of the cases, wiped
out state law on punitive damages in favor of a single federal rule that
sets forth the only due process-compliant way to assess punitive dam186
ages.
Further, in developing the details of the categorical scheme, the
Court declined to delegate to the states any authority. For instance,
in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court considered how to decide who is a
public official for purposes of determining when the Sullivan actual
187
malice rule applies. It refused to adopt a rule incorporating definitions of “public official” promulgated at the state level. The Court
said that definitions devised for “local administrative purposes” were
not sufficient to determine the scope of “national constitutional pro188
tection.” Concurring separately, Justice Potter Stewart urged more

183
184
185
186

187
188

Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 280.
Justice White pointed out in Gertz that external constitutional limits on damage awards
deprived the states of “the opportunity to experiment with different methods for guarding against abuses.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 397 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). He added that “our constitutional scheme compels a proper respect for the role
of the [s]tates in acquitting their duty to obey the Constitution” and absent a finding that
the states were shirking that duty, the Court had no warrant to impose per se rules on the
states. Id. at 404.
383 U.S. 75, 77 (1966).
Id. at 84.
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respect for the state role in administering the defamation tort, noting, “The protection of private personality, like the protection of life
itself, is left primarily to the individual [s]tates under the Ninth and
189
Justice Abe Fortas agreed, describing the
Tenth Amendments.”
Supreme Court’s imposition of a federal “public official” definition as
190
a “Procrustean bed for state law.”
The Court’s suppression of subfederal organizational units in the
dignitary tort context was not limited to state sovereign units. Many
of the Court’s decisions appear designed to suppress cultural norms
that are developed at the more subsidiary level of local social community, often by disallowing jury instructions or overturning jury
191
factfinding. For example, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. the
Court explained that the “reasonable-man” rule used in most tort
cases to represent standards in the relevant locality were “inconsistent
192
Juswith our national commitment under the First Amendment.”
tice John Marshall Harlan II complained that overriding state auton193
omy to set the standard distorted state-federal relations.
194
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, the Court disallowed an instruction
that let the jury find for the plaintiff without proof of Sullivan malice
for statements that dealt with the private area of a political candidate’s life because the instruction “left the jury far more leeway to act
195
In Rosenbloom,
as censors” than allowed by the First Amendment.
the Court held that letting private citizens recover damages based on
a “jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care” was too speech-prohibitive because publishers would have to
“guess[] how a jury might assess” the pre-publication steps they took
196
to ensure accuracy. Justice Thurgood Marshall added that allowing
private citizens unlimited access to punitive damages in defamation
cases “allows juries to penalize heavily the unorthodox and the un-

189

190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts
from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65 (2012) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment
provides a rule of construction that requires interpreting the First Amendment to avoid
gratuitous impairment of rights that are unenumerated, but nevertheless retained, including rights to seek compensation via tort for infringements of individual dignity).
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 101 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 49–51. Note that the holding of Rosenbloom was later disavowed in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 62–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
Id. at 275.
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50.

Apr. 2015]

ALCHEMY OF STATE ACTION

1163

popular [speech] and exact little [punishment] from other[, more
197
uncontroversial, speakers].”
Later, in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association. v. Bresler, the
Court again suppressed subsidiary community values when it overturned a jury finding that a newspaper article saying a local property
owner was trying to “blackmail” the city in a land deal was a defama198
The Court held that no reatory imputation of criminal behavior.
sonable reader would have understood the word that way, despite the
199
fact that each member of the jury had done just that. Concurring,
Justice Byron White wondered how the Court had “superior insight
with respect to how the word ‘blackmail’ would be understood by the
200
ordinary reader in Greenbelt, Maryland.”
In sum, the Sullivan line of cases reveals a steady vertical overreaching by the Court, replacing state tort law rules with uniform
federal rules and reaching beyond state polities into subsidiary communities represented by juries to invalidate jury instructions that give
them leeway to apply local norms and to reverse their findings of fact.
If in Sullivan the Court had defined state action prudentially, to include just the verdict, it would have been restricted to overturning
the verdict and warning state courts and juries against imposing local
norms on national speech in the future. That path would have relegated the Court to a mere supervisory role while state courts and juries confronted the increasingly common local-versus-national fact
pattern on an incremental basis. Instead it transformed the dignitary
torts into a subcategory of constitutional law and supplied a set of

197
198
199
200

Id. at 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7–10 (1970).
Id. at 8, 14.
Id. at 22 (White, J., concurring). This distrust of juries extended into the IIED sphere as
well. The Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell held that the “outrageousness” standard for the IIED tort was so subjective that jurors could “impose liability on the basis of
[their] tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression,”
thus justifying application of the actual malice guard rails to IIED suits brought by public
figures. 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). Similarly, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court predicted that in
cases involving polarizing social issues, “a jury is ‘unlikely to be neutral with respect to the
content of [the] speech . . . .’” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510
(1984)). The risk of jury bias was not permissible, it reasoned, because “insulting, and
even outrageous” speech must be “tolerate[d]” to provide sufficient First Amendment
“breathing space” for speech. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted). This possibility justified overturning the jury verdict without applying the actual
malice test to try to distill out intent to injure from intent to circulate a message. Id. (It
has been pointed out elsewhere that an intent test turning on falsehood is not well-suited
for IIED, which is an action for behavior that is outrageous whether it involves true or
false statements.)
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rules, flattening subsidiary community norms and indirectly delegitimizing subsidiary community as a legally relevant unit of social organ201
ization. This scheme was celebrated in the short-term as a vindication of liberal democratic values that protected nationally significant
speech while preserving some tort recourse for the most injurious or
insignificant speech. But the early promise of Sullivan has withered.
This failure can be traced back to the horizontal and vertical overreaching that stemmed from the Court’s imprudent state action analysis in the case.
VI. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SULLIVAN
The Court’s categorical public law/private law tort scheme held
great early promise—Alexander Meiklejohn famously declared Sulli202
But the Sullivan
van “an occasion for dancing in the streets.”
scheme has inadvertently weakened tort without galvanizing the kind
of civically useful speech the Court seemed to anticipate.
First, speech the Court originally intended to divert for private law
treatment has steadily been shifted into the public category because
online speech is making the public-private divide obsolete. As a result, plaintiffs injured by democratically insignificant speech are functionally less protected than the Court intended when it overreached
horizontally into the legislative function to devise its constitutional
matrix for these causes of action. Second, because the vertical imposition of national values has reduced local courts’ and juries’ autonomy to respond to social media injuries such as revenge porn or mug
shot extortion sites, the Court has drastically changed the concept of
tort “duty” that individuals are understood to owe to others. The categorical scheme, and its ever-wider application, signals that behavior
thought for centuries to be unacceptable is, in fact, unremarkable.
Finally, it is not at all clear that the shrinking of tort has been paired
with an expansion of the news coverage the Court intended to incentivize. Hard news and investigative journalism has dramatically declined in the half-century since Sullivan.

201

202

In other areas of the law, doctrine has accommodated community-privileging principles
and liberal democratic principles simultaneously. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism,
Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (1991) (noting that general jurisdiction
“reflects assumptions about the importance of community membership” while specific jurisdiction reflects liberal democratic assumptions that authority for state intervention is
derived from the harm principle).
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (1964).
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A. The Court’s Constitutional Legislation has Grown Obsolete
State common-law lawmaking, particularly in the tort context, is
marked by flexibility and incremental evolution over time in response
203
to changed circumstances and changing community mores. Historically, a robust private law of tort has provided an efficient ex post responsive signal about the proper use of innovations that are too new
204
or too difficult to treat ex ante via statute (such as automobiles or
205
toxic torts ). The Court’s horizontal overreaching to legislate a categorical scheme for defamation, privacy, and IIED has prevented tort
from bringing its unique jurisprudential benefits to bear in the age of
electronic speech and social media. By imposing fixed federalized
categories to assign value to speech and dignity, the Court has
thwarted the common law’s ability to adapt to changed circumstances.
At the same time, electronic speech and social media have disrupted the traditional speech configurations that were the basis of
the Court’s “public,” “private,” “knowing,” and “negligent” categories.
Speech transmitted over Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and
on websites and blogs is performative. It is transmitted by or about
public officials, institutional celebrities, and obscure individuals, and
then forwarded, followed, retweeted, liked, and shared among these
206
same constituencies. These platforms render the public private and

203
204

205
206

Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1331 (1994) (describing tort as “being in perpetual process”).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (abolishing the requirement of privity as a basis for product liability causes of action); see, e.g., Sally H.
Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass Consumer
Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005) (noting that MacPherson was a response to the
emerging mass market in which automakers were selling vehicles before perfecting their
technology in order to capitalize on growing demand).
See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 131, at 475.
See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919
(2005). Strahilevitz questions the soundness of a normative approach to determining
whether information is private, because “individuals and communities will disagree substantially about what information is more private and what is more public” and because
deputizing judges to make that normative assessment poses a “real danger that the standards of propriety that they introduce into the law will clash with attitudes that reflect
changing cultural beliefs and varied preferences among the citizenry[,]” especially in response to “changes in technologies or social norms.” Id. at 931 & n.30. He urges instead
an empirical approach to distinguishing between the public and the private using social
network theory to reach an objective conclusion about what extent of information sharing can be expected to follow particular disclosures. Id. at 919, 921. The scope of sharing
within one’s network can be considered “private” whereas sharing beyond that scope is
considered “public.” It is not necessary to weigh in on the relative benefits of a normative
or empirical approach to distinguishing between public and private to appreciate that
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the private public, dissolving the boundary lines that are the heart of
the Court’s categorical scheme.
Several examples illustrate the obsolescence of these “public” and
“private” categories. In 2011, a class of Facebook users sued the so207
cial media service over its “Sponsored Story” program. Prior to set208
tlement of the suit and discontinuation of the program, Facebook
had used participant actions such as “liking” a product or event to
generate faux news stories about the user’s endorsement of the
209
product or event. The stories were actually considered advertising
and were paid for by the entity that sold the product or sponsored
the event, to be shared with any of the user’s friends who were able to
210
Defending against the class
see the original “Like” or “Check In.”
suit for misappropriation of their names and likenesses, Facebook invoked the constitutional protection for matters of “legitimate public
interest,” arguing that the relevant “public” in the Facebook configuration would be “the audience with whom the User chose to share the
content in the first place[,]” meaning that the Sponsored Story is a
matter of public interest and thus sufficiently newsworthy to fall with211
in an exception to the relevant California misappropriation statute.
The distortion of the “public interest” category is further illustrated by Stayart v. Google, Inc., brought by Wisconsin woman Beverly
Stayart after finding that her name had inexplicably become linked
with erectile dysfunction products in the Yahoo and Google search
212
engines. Stayart’s initial suit against Yahoo for violations of the
Lanham Act was dismissed because the court found she had no
213
She subsequently sued Google
commercial interest in her name.
for misappropriation and was again denied relief, this time because
her initial suit against Yahoo meant that her association with ED
drugs was now considered a matter of “public interest[,] primarily
because [she] has made it one” by suing first Yahoo and then
214
Google. In the context of electronic speech, it is plausible to argue

207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

identifying the boundary between the two is a task complicated by the continued growth
of social media networks.
See Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 11-CV-01726 LHK).
Somini Sengupta, To Settle Lawsuit, Facebook Alters Policy for Its Like Button, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2012, at B2.
See Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra
note 207.
Id.
Id. at 21.
710 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2013).
Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 623 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 2010).
Stayart v. Google, 710 F.3d at 723.
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today that these plaintiffs are involved in matters of public concern
simply by virtue of speaking online, and thus given reduced entitle215
ment to reputation, privacy, or emotional well-being.
Notably, in both Fraley and Stayart the objectionable electronic
content was generated not by any individual at Facebook, Yahoo, or
Google, but by algorithms. The increasing use of algorithms to generate content on these platforms makes the task of sifting “knowing
or reckless” language choices from merely “negligent” language
choices complex if not impossible. Increasingly, media and social
media actors use automation and coding to pull bits of information
216
This reality calls into further
to generate so-called “click bait.”
question the current viability of the constitutional common law
scheme, whereby First Amendment protection for allegedly tortious
speech fluctuates with the scienter of the speaker. Knowing or reckless circulation of falsehoods (or privacy-invading or outrageous
speech) is less protected while merely negligent circulation of problematic speech is more protected. Commentators have recently begun to consider whether algorithms should be considered speech,
state regulation of which would be covered by the First Amend217
They have not yet turned to the more complex question of
ment.
how to determine the level of culpability represented by companies
devising programs to generate automated content or by individual
coders executing corporate content objectives. At any rate, the increasing use of algorithms to produce content is outpacing the
Court’s constitutional categories.
The Court could not have foreseen that the revolution in speech
technology would uncouple its proxy categories from the underlying
legal values they were designed to represent. Nevertheless, technology has evolved so that the public and private figure categories no
215

216

217

See, e.g., Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 60–63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
a jet ski hobbyist who posted to an internet news group about his jet ski customizing business, and who was later mentioned in jet ski magazines, was a public figure because his
posts to the website were a voluntary entry into public controversy).
See, e.g., Alex Halperin, This Man Decides What You Read, SALON (Oct. 27, 2013, 11:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/27/this_man_decide_what_you_read (describing the
media practice of generating provocative “click-bait headlines . . . unnecessary
slideshows . . . [and] other chicanery to inflate page views” and entice advertisers, based
on data from engagement services that track how specific words drive clicks and extend
the time spent on page views).
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2013)
(“Instead, I will look to broadly accepted sources and forms of legal reasoning—which in
the First Amendment context means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence—and consider whether those sources lead to the conclusion that algorithm-based outputs are
speech for First Amendment purposes.”).
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longer synchronize with the democratic relevance of speech. As a result, democratically irrelevant (and injurious) speech must increas218
ingly be sifted into the “public” category, where “dice are loaded”
219
against plaintiffs.
B. The Court’s Suppression of Subsidiary Community Values has Changed
the Notion of “Duty” in Dignitary Tort
One writer has said that “‘defamation law’s symbolic function is
even more vital than its instrumental one’ because it is a ‘deliberate
220
public expression and affirmation of social codes and values.’”
218

219

220

In this respect, the Sullivan line of cases is an example of what has been described as “interest creep,” a phenomenon in which courts’ previous acceptance of a category of government interests leads to the invocation of that interest in an increasingly vague and undocumented fashion to justify particular outcomes without diligent judicial review. Dov
Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 273–276 (2014). Interest creep has been
used to describe the incremental expansion of state interests such as national security or
the protection of potential life that are proffered to justify legislation and the inverse contraction of judicial scrutiny when these state interests are invoked. In the context of dignitary injuries, however, the interest creep appears to have proceeded in the opposite direction, with courts invoking free speech interests in an increasingly sweeping fashion in
order to avoid giving weight to the state interest in injury compensation for dignitary
torts. For instance, in Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998), the California court held that airing secret camera footage of a woman talking to emergency responders during her rescue from a car accident was not actionable as a public disclosure
of private facts tort because the footage was relevant to the public issue of highway safety.
Contrast this result with the Court’s grudging recognition of a constitutional protection
for a news report of a deceased rape victim’s name, which the Court said was required only because it was provided to the reporter by a court official during the course of a criminal trial against the perpetrator, but that otherwise would not have qualified as a matter
of public concern. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495–97 (1975).
Lidsky, supra note 140, at 46. The plaintiff’s challenges (and the likelihood of speechprivileging interest creep) are amplified by the unique procedural posture of tort cases.
Private individuals, rather than the state, are the real parties in interest in these cases. So
unlike constitutional challenges to legislative burdens on speech, where the state is a litigant, in judicial review of tort results burdening speech, the state is not on hand to defend its common-law tort principles. The plaintiff is not well-positioned to defend the
state’s interest in a dignitary tort scheme, or in the specifics of that scheme. This ill fit is
exacerbated by the common-law nature of tort, where state “law” has not been reduced to
a single definitive text (like a statute) but is instead diffused over a series of court opinions addressing variable fact patterns. Further, these “laws” typically feature opentextured terms interpreted by juries that have left behind no record of the rationales for
their verdicts. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 117, at 767–771; id. at 770 (“The point is only that a court’s role is unusually complex when it is both the sole state actor and the decision-maker that is asked to decide whether the state action violates the First Amendment.”). This is one reason the traditional strict scrutiny/compelling interest regime for
reviewing speech laws has not been squarely applied to speech torts.
Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”: Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual Be Defamatory?, 44 GA. L. REV. 739, 766 (2010) (quoting John C. Watson, Defamation by Racial Misidentification: A Study of the Social Tort, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 77, 78 (2002)); Joseph R.
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Consequently, providing private law recourse for the kind of “moral
injuries” effected by dignitary torts reasserts subsidiary community
behavioral norms. Conversely, formal legal rules limiting that recourse also shape norms, but in the other direction. The transformation of private dignitary torts tilted towards plaintiffs into public
law causes of action tilted against plaintiffs has signaled, in effect, that
speakers no longer owe a duty of care to the subjects of their speech.
Ironically the informal, low-cost signal provided by dignitary tort law
waned just as a new type of community—the virtual community—
began to populate the internet. The absence of an ex post private
law mechanism to allow for the development of values within these
online communities has led to a widespread view that no holds are
221
barred when it comes to internet speech.
Defamation, IIED, and privacy torts carry messages quite apart
from the actual speech articulated by the tortfeasor; “[t]hey are ways
a wrongdoer has of saying to us, ‘I count but you do not,’ ‘I can use
you for my purposes,’ or ‘I am here up high and you are there down
222
below.’” The failure to correct that message and reassert relational
equality between tortfeasor-speaker and plaintiff-victim “says, in effect, that [the victim] can be treated in this way, and that such treat223
ment is acceptable.”
The Sullivan line of cases says that as a matter of constitutional
law, dignitary tort victims who cannot prove themselves purely private
figures may be treated this way, and that such treatment is acceptable.
Pre-Sullivan norms that falsehoods about private individuals could be
224
treated as per se injurious or a basis for punitive damages, that

221

222

223
224

Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV.
54, 57 (1968) (“A governmental agent’s act may have symbolic import because it affects
the designation of public norms. The courtroom decision or the legislative act often glorifies the values of one group and demeans those of another.”).
See, e.g., Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (describing an
anonymous blogger who in light of a would-be defamation claim argued that the plaintiff
would likely fail as a matter of law because “Internet blogs serve as a modern day forum
for conveying personal opinions, including invective and ranting, [so that online statements] . . . when considered in that context, cannot be reasonably understood as factual
assertions”).
Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 86, 93 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (quoting Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness
and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25
(1988) (explaining the messages implicit in moral injury)).
Hershovitz, supra note 222, at 94 (quoting Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness, LXII PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 529, 530 (2001)).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (“Because plaintiff’s
complaint sufficiently avers a libel per se, actual and punitive damages may be recovered
without pleading special damages.”).
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speech even on matters of public concern could not be expressed so
outrageously that severe emotional consequences were certain to fol225
low, and that fictionalized accounts of a person’s private life were
226
compensable, have been muffled considerably by the imposition of
constitutional rules that prevent juries from awarding damages for injuries that result when the norms are ignored.
The importation of these speech-privileging norms on electronic
platforms has had a demonstrably corrosive effect in a number of settings. For instance, cyberbullying that is difficult to treat in tort—
cybercitizens are now arguably “public” for legal purposes—has led to
227
a well-publicized number of the teen and tween suicides. The blasé
attitude of some digital natives about the duty to exercise care when
using these platforms was demonstrated in the aftermath of a 2013
228
A fourteen-year-old girl
tween cyberbullying suicide in Florida.
admitted that she had been one of the instigators bullying a twelveyear-old who eventually killed herself. After the suicide, the instigator
posted on Facebook that “Yes, [I know] I bullied Rebecca and she
229
killed herself [but] IDGAF [I don’t give a f***] . . . .” Similarly, revenge porn magnate Hunter Moore responded to criticisms of his
230
sites in an interview by asking, “Why should I care? It’s not my life.”
To the extent that tort indicates to the community what behavior is
undesirable, disabling the dignitary torts indicates to the community
that careless, injury-inflicting speech is no longer undesirable. The
weakening of the tort-signaling mechanism has arguably contributed
to the failure of virtual communities to develop strong norms against
injurious speech.

225

226
227

228

229
230

Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986) (“We need not consider whether the
statements in question constituted opinion, as the issue is whether their publication was
sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 (1967) (“[T]he statute gives him a right of action
when his name, picture, or portrait is the subject of a ‘fictitious’ report or article.”).
Hershovitz, supra note 222, at 94 (quoting Hieronymi, supra note 223, at 546); see, e.g.,
Lizette Alvarez, Felony Counts for 2 in Suicide of Bullied 12-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2013, at A20.
She Killed Herself ‘But IDGAF’; ‘Bullies’ Busted, N.Y. POST (Oct. 15, 2013, 5:26 PM)
http://nypost.com/2013/10/15/she-killed-herself-but-idgaf-i-dont-give-a-f-bully-teencharged-in-girls-suicide/.
Id.
Carol Kuruvilla, Revenge Porn Curators Defend Their X-Rated Websites, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb.
8, 2013, 3:53 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/minds-revenge-porncurators-aricle-1.1259114.
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C. The Failure of Sullivan to Incentivize a Vigorous Press
Finally, it is far from clear that the dignitary costs following from
the constitutionalization of these torts has been offset by the speechenhancing benefits the Court envisioned. The Sullivan scheme
emerged just as the business model for news organizations evolved.
Families that had long run news organizations as private concerns
began to take their companies public, assuming a fiduciary duty to
maximize profits for shareholders. When this change in financial incentive structures was coupled with the Court’s provision of a constitutional rule protecting careless reporting about public figures, one
result was a noticeable shift in institutional emphasis from hard news
reporting to soft reporting on celebrities and personalities.
In the early 1960s, just as the Court was remaking defamation law,
the market was remaking the paradigmatic news organization. Historically, newspapers and local television and radio stations were organized as closely held corporations, often owned by local families for
231
These news institutions were as concerned with
many generations.
232
“Beginning in the
civic welfare as they were with news coverage.
1960’s, in order to generate capital to finance acquisitions, to reduce
indebtedness, and to fend off hostile takeover attempts, newspaper
companies went public. Prominent among these were Dow Jones,
Gannett, Gray Communication, Lee Enterprises, Media General, New
233
York Times, and Times Mirror [and the Washington Post].”
This ownership change shifted the organizations’ foremost responsibility from serving as community institutions to maximizing
shareholder wealth. The products that emerged from these business
models “underproduce[d] news that enhance[d] citizens’ political
interest, knowledge, and sophistication, in large part because the
commercial pressure on suppliers is to attract the largest audience
possible. The average audience member does not seek complex, sophisticated information, and the mass media must target that average
234
member.”

231
232

233
234

GILBERT CRANBERG ET AL., TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED
NEWSPAPER COMPANY 24–46 (2001).
See, e.g., KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY 185–86 (1997) (recounting an incident
in which Washington Post publisher Philip Graham convened White House officials in his
office to hear from a reporter about a race riot that had broken out at a local pool and he
told the officials the story had been slated for front-page coverage, but offered to kill the
piece if they would act to quell the violence and integrate the pool).
CRANBERG, supra note 231, at 27.
CRANBERG, supra note 231, at 132; GRAHAM, supra note 232, at 441–42.
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The evolution in news product following Sullivan is reflected in a
1999 study comparing the content of leading U.S. daily newspapers in
1963–64 with their content in 1999. As a percentage of total
newshole, sports and features have risen from 39% to 47%, and hard
235
news has dropped from 35% to 24%.
Further, the constitutional protections that Sullivan introduced
for low-care reporting have been observed to work primarily in favor
of low-care news organizations producing “soft” news, rather than as a
shield for high-care news organizations focusing on envelope-pushing
“hard” news. One economist has summarized that
the principal beneficiaries . . . on balance may be those media enterprises
that use relatively little care in reporting, succeeding more by virtue of
their style and capacity to shock, titillate, or intrigue consumers. At first
blush, this may seem odd: these enterprises are likely both to generate a
substantially greater proportion of false statements and lose a substantially greater proportion of cases than will high-care defendants under a
negligence or strict liability test . . . . But the actual malice rule and precedents implementing it should confer a substantial benefit on these media in aiding their escape from liability. As the proportion of judgments
against low-care media enterprises declines, the incidence of suit against
them should fall correspondingly . . . . Low-care media, thus, probably
face lower total costs—award costs, non-award costs, and defense costs—
after [Sullivan] and may respond by decreasing care or increasing the
amount of speech activity. To the extent that these enterprises’ coverage
is skewed toward some group of public figures—for instance, entertainers—those individuals are likely to be subject to more, or less accurate,
236
critical comment after [Sullivan].

In sum, the Court’s ambitious goal in Sullivan and its progeny—to
incentivize fearless press coverage of democratically relevant issues
while preserving a legally protected interest in reputation—has not
come of age as intended. The Court deployed its alchemic state action analysis to produce more of a prized value—speech—while attempting to preserve a tort channel to vindicate individual dignity.
Instead, the costs to dignity have been steep and the speech payoff
has been slight. The Court’s categorical scheme, when applied to an
electronic speech environment, has funneled into the “public law”
category a great deal of speech the Court originally meant to retain in
the “private law” category. Moreover, the abrupt makeover of dignitary tort from a plaintiff-protective cause of action to a defendant235
236

Carl Sessions Stepp, State of the American Newspaper: Then and Now, AM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Sept. 1999, http://www.ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=3192.
Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law after New York Times: An Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, 101–02 (Everette E.
Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989).
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protective cause of action has signaled to speakers that they no longer
owe a duty of care to the subjects of their speech. Meanwhile, the
constitutional speech subsidy provided by Sullivan has combined with
the profit-oriented model of newly public media companies to yield
more low-care reporting on lucrative “soft news” topics and less constitutionally protected reporting on the kind of democratically relevant “hard news” the Court envisioned when crafting its Sullivan
scheme.
VII. MODERNIZING DIGNITARY TORT
The Court’s imprudent state action analysis in Sullivan set in motion a dysfunctional law of dignitary tort. In contrast, the Court’s
prudential approach to state action may point the way to recalibrating dignitary tort law without forfeiting the central message of the
case: subsidiary communities may not impose their values on the national community.
The prudential approach to state action limits the Court’s response to unconstitutional private law adjudication; either the Court
can announce a rule prohibiting the enforcement of certain kinds of
237
private law arrangements (as in Shelley) or it can remand problematic cases one-by-one with directions to reapply the private law rules in
keeping with constitutional values (as in NAACP v. Claiborne Hard238
ware). The former approach is not a practical way to constitutionally confine the private law of defamation—unlike contracts which may
be entered into without court involvement, complaints of defamation
require judicial adjudication. However, the latter approach to unconstitutional private law verdicts is promising. The promise of Sullivan could be redeemed by shifting away from the Court’s categorical
scheme and instead emphasizing a constitutional rule that externalizing subsidiary community values onto other communities is a speech
abridgment. Failure to prevent verdicts that do externalize subsidiary
norms would lead to reversal or remand of those verdicts—the relevant
state actions—but would not occasion a federal judicial imposition on
local norms.
Articulating this constitutional principle would allow states to
adapt their private law rules or procedures to avoid such results. It
would simultaneously prevent the Court from dictating the content of
state law. Finally, it would relegitimize subsidiary communities as a

237
238

334 U.S. 1 (1948).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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legally relevant unit of social organization. Recognizing that subsidiary communities have the authority to organize their own affairs
could revive dignitary tort as a low-cost, ex post response to injurious
speech. This revival could be especially helpful in addressing online
behavior such as revenge porn, mugshot extortion, and
cyberbullying. Online injuries inflicted within subsidiary virtual
communities would be met with ex post tort verdicts signaling behavioral norms, which could preempt the need for broad ex ante criminal legislation requiring expensive and onerous state enforcement.
A. The Multiplicity of American Communities
Sociologically, “community” may be marked by either a common
nucleus of practice or a common geographic circumstance. Using
this definition, one can identify at least three distinct types of communities prevalent in the United States today: subsidiary geographic
communities, subsidiary virtual communities, and a single national
geographic community.
Subsidiary geographic communities, Gemeinschaft communities,
have traditionally been the legally relevant unit for applying the tort
standard that determines whether speech is injurious (whether it
would deter third parties from association in the defamation tort,
whether it is outrageous in the IIED tort, or whether it is highly offensive to a reasonable person in the public disclosure of private facts
tort). For instance, in one well-known example, a jury drawn from a
Jewish community found defamatory a mistaken listing of a kosher
239
butcher shop in an advertisement for bacon purveyors.
Virtual communities have the capacity to serve the same normgiving role in today’s dignitary tort context. Like geographic communities, which share common local circumstances, these groups
share a common nucleus of practice. Community values for tort purposes have been defined as “the principles or standards of fairness
and propriety with which the community operates. These values are
not necessarily based on any normative theories of justice or morality;
they are culturally determined through the community’s practices
240
Participants in online platforms with recogand shared beliefs.”
nized behavioral norms belong to a community, and typically invest
time in developing and maintaining norms for communicating on

239
240

See Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514 (1930).
Tidmarsh, supra note 203, at 1354.
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the platform. 241 For instance, the speech and interpersonal behavioral norms that apply on Grindr, an application used primarily by gay,
bisexual, and bi-curious men to locate other community members in
close proximity, would likely be very different than those on Club
Penguin, a multiplayer online game that involves a virtual world designed for children and tweens. The groups of people using these
online communications devices each share common practices online,
with a shared set of principles to govern interaction there. Thus,
each can be defined as its own community.
Finally, as the Court intimated in Sullivan, the nation is now far
242
Because of nationwide
more cohesive than it was at the founding.
communications mechanisms and easy interstate travel, Americans
share many more cultural reference points than they did two centuries ago. Further, the Reconstruction Amendments explicitly forged
a shared legal baseline for purposes of several government endeavors,
including voting, protection of the laws, and the provision of due
process associated with deprivations of life, liberty or property. Thus,
engaging in voting, seeking protection of the law, and the valuing of
life, liberty, and property are nationally common practices. Further,
the interconnectedness of daily life—via computer communication,
national television news, national newspapers, interstate travel, and
the like, means that the entire nation can be said to share a common
geographic circumstance in a way that was not true at the Founding.
In short, the entire nation comprises a single Gesellschaft community.
B. Applying an Anti-Externalization Rule to Twenty-First Century
Communities
Constitutional dignitary tort law can move away from the Court’s
failed categorization scheme while obeying Sullivan’s admonition
against externalizing subsidiary community norms onto other communities. If the concept of community were disambiguated to
acknowledge the multiplicity of communities in the twenty-first century—geographically subsidiary communities, virtually subsidiary
communities, and a single national community—the Court could
mediate speech-tort conflicts without relying on complex and obso243
Instead, the constitutional rule would simply prolete categories.
241
242
243

See, e.g., Catalina Danis & Alison Lee, The Negotiation of Norms in an Online Community (IBM
TJ Watson Research Ctr., Working Paper).
See, e.g., RONALD D. BROWN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 1600–1865, at 112–
23 (1976).
Scholars have suggested in other contexts that sensitivity to differently “sized” communities could justify varying levels of constitutional intervention into private behavior. See,
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hibit judicial enforcement of verdicts that externalize subsidiary
community norms. When speech and injury take place entirely within a single subsidiary committee, private law tort treatment is warranted and the subsidiary community is free to develop and apply its
own norms free from constitutional oversight. In contrast, when
speech and injury take place within the national community, or involve a clash between subsidiary communities or between a subsidiary
community and the national community, juries would employ traditional private law tort rules with the constitutional backstop that
courts may not enforce judgments externalizing a subsidiary commu244
This rule would achieve
nity’s norms outside its own boundaries.
the Court’s primary goal of protecting nationally relevant speech, but
not by delegitimizing the subsidiary community as a legally relevant
unit of social organization, and not by signaling that dignitary interests are per se lesser than speech interests. Further, where the subsidiary community at issue is a virtual community that employs injurious
speech norms—such as a revenge porn website or mugshot extortion
site—the rule would require those minority norms to give way if the
national consensus were that the practices were primarily injurious
rather than primarily message-oriented. The current categorical
scheme is apt to reach the opposite result because any plaintiff featured on such a site is likely to be categorized as a public figure required to clear a higher constitutional hurdle.

244

e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669,
669–70 (2003) (proposing that application of the Establishment Clause should fluctuate
in proportion to the level of government that is acting; be it federal, state or local). Tailoring Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this way would capitalize on the “underutilized flexibility” of federalism and would respect community choices about religion and
morality at the most highly subsidiary, compact levels (such as Orthodox Jewish enclaves)
while preserving the national constitutional right to be free of establishment. See generally
id.
In practice, it might be challenging to operationalize the adjudication of dignitary tort
cases pursuant to this principle. At some point, the court would have to determine the
nature of the community or communities within which the allegedly defamatory speech
circulated to identify whether a verdict would have the potential to externalize community norms. Further, as the case progressed, the parties might have to introduce evidence
on the relevant community norms so that a jury would have some basis for determining
defamatoriness, outrageousness, or offensiveness and so that the court would have some
basis for determining the extent of any mismatch. Those challenges are likely surmountable; further, merely changing the relevant constitutional rule in these cases has the power to signal a revived role for tort concepts of duty and to sensitize speakers to the relational significance of their words.
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1. Anti-Externalization in the Intracommunity Context
This “anti-externalization” rule would yield a more dignityprotective outcome than the Court has allowed in intracommunity
cases to date. For instance, it would have led to a different result
where a businessman in Greenbelt, Maryland sued the local paper for
calling him a “blackmailer” in his dealings with the Greenbelt gov245
The jury decided the word could be understood as an
ernment.
imputation of criminality, was therefore defamatory, and awarded
246
damages. The Court rejected the Greenbelt jury’s decision about how
the average local reader would understand the word, and imposed a
national rule that blackmail cannot be understood to impute criminal247
ity. Ironically, this outcome could actually be said to impose moral
values top-down as one would expect from a Gemeinschaft community.
A Gesellschaft community that is consistent with the Court’s liberal
democratic theory interpretation of the First Amendment would be
expected to allow different interpretations of the word to flourish in
subcommunities, without imposing a national interpretation when
248
The proposed rule, allowing prinational speech is not involved.
vate law treatment of intracommunity speech and injury, would yield
that result.
The anti-externalization rule would apply equally well in the
online context. It does not automatically denominate online speech
as “public” just because it is theoretically accessible to a wide number
of people. Instead, if speech takes place within an online community
with agreed upon norms, it would be subject to private law treatment
and the community would be allowed to apply its own norms. For instance, Instagram might be identified as a subsidiary virtual commu245
246
247
248

See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7–8 (1970).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 14–15.
See, e.g., Post, supra note 137, at 504 (explaining the view that the First Amendment is designed to create an antihegemonic domain, one result of which is to “prevent law from
resolving cultural conflict within public discourse by enforcing cultural norms”). It is not
implausible to contend that the Supreme Court’s provision of the meaning of a word for
all time, and for the whole nation, is more of a legal resolution of a cultural conflict than
for a local jury to devise the meaning of the word for purposes of a single, non-binding
tort case. In contrast, some might argue that leaving local communities entirely to their
own devices in determining the significance of speech increases the possibility that homogeneous communities will punish dissenters for unpopular speech. While possible,
the “falsehood” requirement of the tort is a backstop preventing vindictive juries from silencing adversaries at will. Further, the threat of a speech “chill” posed by public law
prohibitions is qualitatively different than the threat posed by private law causes of action
that require an injured plaintiff willing to sue and that results at most in an ex post money damage award (often covered by insurance).
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nity because its users generally adhere to a common nucleus of
shared practices. In one recent example, a rash of so-called “funeral
selfies” on Instagram has occasioned some pushback, with many participants complaining that pictures trivializing funeral rites are out of
249
keeping with the app’s culture. Consequently, a message appended
to an Instagram post might be considered “outrageous” and the basis
for an IIED claim by the injured Instagram user. Instagram’s norms
could be applied to treat the contested speech as a tort without imposing the site’s norms on the national community or on other In250
ternet communities. In these intra-virtual community cases, the
Constitution need not be invoked to prevent morally or geographically distinct communities from imposing their values on conflicting
communities within the state or nation. Further, cohesive communities would have latitude to make normative judgments ex post about
whether external injuries imposed via speech need to be
reinternalized by the defendant community member through a tort
verdict.
2. Anti-Externalization in the Intercommunity Context
Dignitary torts that take place across more than one community
are more complex. In those cases, there is a legitimate fear that
where the plaintiff belongs to an insular community, a tort suit is an
attempt to impose that community’s norms outside its own boundaries, thus inhibiting speakers who are contributing to a national dialog. Conversely, when the plaintiff belongs to the “national” community and sues for injuries inflicted by a defendant abiding by his
insular community norms, there is a legitimate fear that the ostensibly “public” nature of the speech may prevent a tort verdict that
would protect a nationally agreed upon dignitary value.
In these cases, the proposed constitutional rule would prohibit
the imposition of insular norms onto the nation as a whole. Adopting this rule instead of the current constitutional matrix would let juries respond flexibly to behavior that defies public-private and knowing-negligent categorizations. Absent the categorical requirements of
Sullivan, juries would exercise their common-sense familiarity with
249

250

Karen James, Selfies at Funerals? That’s a No, DELAWARE ONLINE (May 12, 2014, 3:53 PM),
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/life/2014/05/12/selfies-funerals/9007293 (noting among other incidents the removal of a Wisconsin National Guard specialist for the
Honor Guard after posting Instagram shots of the Guard mugging in front of a flagdraped casket).
Again, the jury would have to hear evidence regarding Instagram’s norms in order to successfully apply those norms to the contested speech.
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current speech norms. They could determine that a particular
statement was designed primarily to circulate a significant message
(with injury infliction a mere byproduct) that must be protected. Or
they could determine that it was designed primarily to inflict injury
(with message circulation a mere pretext) and may be punished. Liability would be assigned accordingly. The reviewing court, however,
would retain constitutional discretion to reverse or remand if it determines that the verdict amounts to an externalization of the subsidiary community values onto the national community.
This rule would recalibrate the current balance between speech
and dignity. For instance, a plaintiff would be prohibited from leveraging protective local speech norms when challenging the way he was
portrayed in national press coverage of an issue that crossed multiple
jurisdictions. Thus, the rule would have foreclosed the verdict in Sullivan. By the same token, members of insular online communities
would not be able to leverage those communities’ practices to defend
against tort liability for injuries imposed outside the community. The
most relevant current example of such an insular-national mismatch
is revenge porn, the posting of prurient photos of women without
251
This kind of speech is considered
their knowledge or approval.
normatively acceptable among members of the insular virtual communities that use these sites, but is widely acknowledged to inflict
252
dignitary injuries on non-members. In the case of this community
mismatch, the insular community would not be allowed to impose its
norms onto the nation at large. If a jury taking account of national
sentiment determined that a particular instance of revenge porn was
“outrageous,” for instance, the proposed constitutional rule would
permit the imposition of IIED liability even though the insular community that hosted the speech did not consider it outrageous.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s current constitutional common law of dignitary tort
establishes a categorical preference for the community values of the
nation over the community values of more subsidiary groups, even
where the two are not in conflict. As more speech goes online and

251
252

Citron & Franks, supra note 1, at 346.
Id. at 351 n.35 (citing Cyber Civil Rights Statistics on Revenge Porn, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2013),
for the proposition that “more than 80% of revenge porn victims experience severe emotional distress and anxiety”); id. at 390 n.290 (noting that two major metropolitan daily
newspapers, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune, have taken editorial positions
condemning revenge porn).
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becomes publicly accessible, the use of “public” and “private” categories to distinguish between constitutional treatment and private law
treatment for these torts is no longer effective. Moreover, the Court
has touted the scheme as one that extracts from tort litigation im253
This
permissible value judgments about the content of speech.
representation is disingenuous—prioritizing a community inevitably
means prioritizing a set of values.
For instance, the Court has suggested that in the obscenity context, requiring local communities to tolerate material offensive to
them is just as problematic as limiting national access to material
254
based on a single community’s disapproval. The Court has explicitly allowed local communities to provide the standard for prurience in
255
Those communities
challenges to regulation of obscene material.
are generally thought to be less tolerant of obscenity. By selecting local communities as the structurally privileged unit of analysis, the
Court was essentially picking sides in this cultural conflict. When the
Court established a set of default rules that privilege the national
community in the dignitary tort context, it was using the same tactic
in reverse. Identifying the national community norms as the constitutional norms meant the Court was essentially picking sides in a cultural conflict. This use of ostensibly neutral principles to dictate
speech preferences top-down is typified by the Court’s decision in
Bresler to replace a local jury interpretation of the ambiguous word
256
“blackmail” with its own interpretation.
This sharp dealing is a direct (if subtle) outgrowth of the Court’s
state action analysis in Sullivan. The First Amendment is designed to
prohibit government preference for particular values, but the Court’s
scheme incorporates a vertical preference for “national” values over
those of subsidiary communities. Ironically, the Equal Protection
253

254

255

256

See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding that without
constitutional limits the IIED tort threatened to sanction speech based on jury disagreement with its content); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting and noting that defamation liability without constitutional limits
could lead to punishment of “unorthodox and unpopular” speech).
See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 320–21
(2008) (explaining that the three-part obscenity test announced in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 30 (1973) allows local communities to determine whether, by reference to their
local norms, material is offensive).
See id. at 321 (“But it is perfectly permissible to apply a local standard, even in a federal
obscenity prosecution. Indeed, the Court held, it is perfectly proper for a court to instruct a jury to apply community standards without ever specifying which community.”)
(footnotes omitted).
See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 22 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
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Clause arguably does adopt a set of preferred social values (those of
257
the Reconstruction Era Northern States), so that a broad definition
of state action to impose those values in cases like Shelley or Evans
would have had some constitutional basis. In contrast, neither the
First Amendment nor the Due Process Clause through which it was
incorporated against the states endorse any set of values; they are de258
So manipulating state action
signed to establish a value-free zone.
to allow a vertical imposition of “national” values (implicitly, the cul259
turally elite values of the Court itself) onto dignitary tort may be
more constitutionally suspect than manipulating state action to remedy perceived violations of other constitutional provisions would have
260
been.
Further, the horizontal overreach into the legislative function to
establish a categorical speech regime has functionally disabled tort,
both as a private remedy and as a social signaling device. Moreover,
it has not produced a marked increase in the quality or quantity of
democratically relevant speech. Fifty years after Sullivan, it is time for
the Court to consider backing away from its quasi-statutory tort
scheme in favor of a more flexible rule that merely prohibits the imposition of insular values onto the nation. This flexible rule has the
potential to reinvigorate dignitary tort as online speech continues to
metastasize in unexpected ways. The second coming of these torts
would encourage experiential, bottom-up development of behavioral
261
norms in an incremental, ex post fashion. Further, treating online
behavior that inflicts individual injury as primarily a matter for tort
law would foreclose the need for lawmakers to criminalize wide

257

258
259
260

261

See Post, supra note 137, at 499 (“The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . realized
that the right to Equal Protection of the Laws would require courts to impose the cultural
values of the North upon the South.”).
See id.
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
145, 146 (1998).
See Post, supra note 137, at 499. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to administer a per se
preference for a national or local community in the speech context, when online communication defies geographic boundaries. The circulation of would-be obscene materials
on the internet has led some lower courts to find application of local standards impracticable, and a brewing circuit split on the question suggests that the Court may have to revisit the viability of the geographically local community test. See, e.g., Noah Hertz-Bunze,
The Internet, Obscenity and Community Standards: The Emerging Kilbride and Little Circuit Split,
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://iplj.net/blog/
archives/1660.
See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 131, at 478–79 (discussing history of tort as “continually evolving to address new social problems”).
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swaths of electronic speech ex ante from the top-down and may actu262
ally be the most speech-protective way to address these phenomena.

262

Criminal treatment carries some costs that tort may not. First, criminal statutes would
have to withstand a different, and potentially more difficult, level of constitutional scrutiny. See Citron & Franks, supra note 1, at 374–75. Further, the state machinery required to
pass these statutes and to prosecute violations is more expensive than “private attorney
general” tort treatment. To be sure, litigating revenge porn tort suits does cost individual
plaintiffs (although most attorneys would likely take such cases on a contingency basis)
and defendants may be judgment-proof or nearly so. Id. at 358. However, merely providing a robust cause of action for such cases has expressive value, and even a small number
of high-profile plaintiff verdicts in such cases has the potential to recalibrate notions of
what duty is owed within the intimate relationships that typically lead to the taking and
sharing of materials likely to be found on such sites. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 229.

